Showing posts with label Cavanaugh. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cavanaugh. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 05, 2007

Rahner and Cavanaugh: martyrdom in Roman Catholicism

Karl Rahner has been among the most prominent voices urging for such a broadening of the notion of martyrdom. Traditionally, those who have died in active struggle have been excluded from consideration as martyrs, however righteous the cause. While he recognizes the important caveats that must be observed (in order to exclude, for example, the crusading knights of the Middle Ages), Rahner argues that this element of active struggle often springs directly from a pure inner conviction about Christ:

…the death Jesus ‘passively endured was the consequence of the struggle he waged against those in his day who wielded religious and political power. He died because he fought: his death must not be seen in isolation from his life. Putting this argument the other way around, someone who dies while fighting actively for the demands of his or her Christian convictions…can also be said patiently to endure his or her death.

He is joined in this plea by the liberation theologian Leonardo Boff, who, hearkening back to Origen (over the head of Augustine) argues for the inclusion of ‘political martyrs’: by which he means to indicate those who witness to the truth of the kingdom in active struggle against oppression. The emphasis within this conception of martyrdom falls almost entirely on the activity performed by the martyr, and its (presumed) resemblance to the teaching and action of Christ himself. This has of course a particular application in the Latin American context in which liberation theology arose. However, the difficulty that Boff runs into (and Rahner risks) is that he makes abstract principles distilled from the life of Christ by whatever hermeneutical process fundamental to the recognition of a martyr aside from the actual narrative of that life. As William Cavanaugh puts it (speaking of Boff and fellow theologian Sobrino) they ‘assume that the content of Christ’s life, death and resurrection can be isolated apart from their form’. If martyrdom is reduced in this way to some principle – ‘love’ or ‘justice’ – apart from imitating the pattern of Christ’s life, then it is susceptible to becoming criteria-less. It loses its distinctly Christ-like characteristics that might mark it out from other sorts of acts. Cavanaugh continues:

The imitation of Christ is not reducible to some principle such as “love”, but is rather a highly skilled performance learned in a disciplined community of virtue by careful attention to the concrete contours of the Christian life and death as borne out by Jesus and the saints.

Perhaps one of the problems here is in the Roman Catholic need to identify exactly who is and who isn't a martyr/saint...

Thursday, March 15, 2007

Bruce D Marshall - Martyrdom and Truth

A number of authors I have encountered - namely Cavanaugh, Vanhoozer and DB Hart - stress the importance of martyrdom as the form of Christian truth-telling. Martyrdom is of missiological and apologetic importance - of course. It is a witness of a particular kind. In the postmodern as in the premodern world it is the ultimate proof that anyone can offer.

Bruce D Marshall in his book Trinity and Truth joins the ranks of the above. Is focus here is a epistemology. Here is fascinating excerpt in which he compares and contrasts two methods of establishing truth - scientific experiment and Christian practice:


The parallel between Christian practice and scientific experiment is, to be sure, inexact. As the martyr’s willingness to die for her faith in Christ most vividly shows, undertaking the life of obedience for which the gospel calls goes hand in hand with being convinced that the gospel is true, while scientists undertake experiments precisely in order to become convinced (or dissuaded) that an otherwise hypothetical set of beliefs is true. Failure of predicted results, moreover, tends to disconfimr the theory which underwrote the predictions, while Christians think they may and should believe the gospel precisely in the face of their own abject failures to live in a way congruent with it.


But the partial disanalogy apparently fails to bear on the relevant similarity of Christian beliefs to scientific hypotheses: the successful practice of the Christian community and its members might be explained otherwise than by the truth of the beliefs held by those who engage in the practice. An objector to the pragmatic thesis might agree to a significant extent with the Christian community's description of a practice...and might agree that the practice is good and right, but might propose a different, indeed incompatible, account of why the practice goes on and succeeds... (p. 186ff)


So, martyrdom is testimony, and as persuasive testimony perhaps as such there is: but it is not proof unless you already inhabit the world-view and practices of the martyr.
Marshall concludes:
Christians will inevitably encounter a kind of epistemic affliction, because they not only hold true, but insist on treating as epistemically primary across the board, beliefs which will be rationally contestable until the end of time…The affliction which goes with holding these beliefs may go beyond having to avoid giving them up. For the martyr’s willingness to die for her faith in Christ, a perseverance no less arduous for being whilly the Spirit’s gift, is rightly reserved the highest praise. p. 216
To summarise: the truth hurts. (Actually, is this a good title for my dissertation? Martyrdom - the Truth Hurts)