Saturday, April 30, 2011

From Sydney to Skopje 3 - Theological Anthropology

I am here in Macedonia as a guest of the newly founded Balkan Institute for Faith and Culture, which is run by my good friends Kosta and Nada Milkov:




One of the things that the BFIC would like to promote is a series of lectures/seminars for pastors called 'Theology for Life'. Yesterday I began teaching a group of around twenty evangelical pastors and pastor's wives from all over the country and from Bulgaria as well my 'Theological Anthropology' material. There were Baptists, Congregationalists, independents, and others too. The material was designed for Moore College's MA course/4th year programme - that is, for theology graduates who are in pastoral ministry or about to enter it, but with a degree of assumed knowledge. The group of pastors and their wives certainly all fit this profile, and participated knowledgeably and insightfully. I am completing the course today (Saturday) by teaching from 9am to 6pm. I believe we will be stopping for lunch!





Here is Kosta at the church building where the seminar is being held.





This is the Evangelical Church of Macedonia in Skopje.





This is the seminar about to get down to work.



And here we are four hours later having finished for the evening. It was a very enjoyable time with a lot of stimulating discussion and plenty of laughs!





Friday, April 29, 2011

From Sydney to Skopje 2

So I have mostly recovered from my jetlag, and I don't look so much like this anymore:








I have been resting up good at Kosta, Nada and Gabriella's flat in Skopje:




They have real mountains here - and you can almost see them in my poor photograph:






Then on Thursday afternoon I went to my first speaking event at the Evangelical Church in Skopje. I was speaking on 'The Christian Life - Faith, Prayer, Obedience:








30 or more people turned up from 4pm, and then at 6pm my last talk was part of a service that including singing and prayer. We sang 'Blessed be the Name' and 'Lord I lift your name on high'. As it turned out, we were also visited by a mission team from a bible college in Tirana, Albania who in turn brought with them some Italians. So I had my talk translated into Macedonian, Albanian and Italian. It was a lively meeting!






We then went out for some food:



Tomorrow I am teaching Theological Anthroplogy to a group of pastors and others. Ciao!

Wednesday, April 20, 2011

Andrew Cameron's Joined-Up Life

My colleague and friend Andrew Cameron has just published his book Joined-Up Life. It's an account of what we usually call 'ethics'.

Anyone who knows Andrew will know that he is one of the most perceptive and interesting Christian thinkers around. I am about 100 pages in and I can say already that the book marries pith and profoundity - no mean feat.

Monday, April 18, 2011

Euthanasia as corrosive of care relationships

I was once privileged, when I was a School Chaplain several years ago, to lead an hour-long discussion with a class of sixteen year olds on the question of suicide.
As Chaplain, I was privy to information that many in the class were not: that there were at any given time as many as ten students in the school for whom there was grave concern about the possibility that they might attempt self-harm.

The question I put to the students was this: what would you do if a friend of yours told you that they had decided to kill themselves?

The answer was chilling – more chilling than they realised. As one they insisted that, although this was a sad circumstance, you ought not intervene and tell someone else they couldn’t do it, if that was their decision. You could certainly not say to the person that they were doing the wrong thing.

For the students, the autonomous decision of the individual was absolutely sacrosanct, even to this terrible point.

This story is not about euthanasia, exactly, but it is about the kind of moral language we are equipped with and with which we are equipping young people. And it demonstrates the prison into which we have locked ourselves with the language of free choice. The priority of the individual’s right to choose renders us inarticulate just where we most need to say something. It coarsens our moral language. It makes us unable to say to someone else: ‘You can rely on me to stay with you and preserve your life as far as I can even when you feel like doing harm to yourself.’

It is the language of moral autonomy that propels the push for voluntary euthanasia, and renders us speechless to oppose it. For if my individual freedom to choose is the trump card in all moral questions, then the best thing that the law can do is to facilitate that choice. In this instance, that means legislating so as to enable the medical profession to assist in the suicide of terminally ill patients in their care should the patient seek to be so assisted. If individual choice is ultimate, then it seems to me there is no argument.

But I would argue that, as a theological perspective shows us, individual choice is not ultimate. It is part of a whole suite of moral factors that have bearing on these very complex and difficult circumstances. The choice to end one’s own life is, in most circumstances, an immoral choice that the law should protect us from making; and in which the law should protect others from complicity.

Why is this?
Because we are, as the Christian story tells us and plain observation confirms, not essentially agents of individual choice, but creatures made for community. We are made for love and trust more than we are made for freedom. And it is to love sustained by trust that we owe our moral decision-making, and not to freedom. It is not permission that we need, but a knowledge of what our licence to act in a certain way might cost others.

We should remember that for Christians, life itself is not an absolute good, nor even the highest of goods. Christians carry before them an astonishing symbol - the cross of Jesus Christ. At the very centre of the Christian gospel is an act of voluntary self-sacrifice to suffering and death. This is what Christians call ‘the good news’. That free laying down of one’s life becomes in the New Testament the very source of life for those who follow Christ. And it becomes the model for their lives in turn. The Christian is called to a cross-shaped existence as an echo of and a testimony to that relinquishing of a life that others may live. Christians are those who are ready to die for what they believe – and have done so in their droves down the centuries.

What does this teach us? That life is good as a wonderful gift from a good creator, but that it is not the ultimate good. There are some things that are worth giving up your precious life for. As American theologian Stanley Hauerwas says: ‘Dying is not the tragedy but … dying for the wrong thing’. Christians repudiated the Roman cult of noble suicide to preserve one’s honour. But they certainly accepted that a violent death might well be the price of a life lived in the service of God. Greater love has no-one than this: to lay down one’s life for one’s friends.

What the martyrs show us is that death is unavoidable – but that the manner in which one dies may remarkably affirm human life. If a death affirms human life it must do so by affirming the communities of trust and care that are basic to human existence. One of the basic conditions that shapes human community is our willingness to live and our assumption that others share it.

If we have some manner of control about the manner of our dying, then, let us rule out the possibility that the voluntary euthanasia proposal may well afford us. Because death seems so lonely, the temptation to which we may succumb is to think of our dying as an isolated incident quite apart from anyone else. What is in fact the case is that in calling on others to assist us in ending our life, we are normalising this manner of death. We are inviting the medical profession to ask why the person in the next bed has not chosen the same but is insisting on staying alive when the bed is needed and the palliative care is expensive. We are inviting our community to increase its loveless-ness towards the elderly and the sick – after all, if their choice is to stay alive, then they can be blamed for it.

Law is a blunt instrument in the moral life. I am not heedless that the change in the law is sought for the purpose of alleviating great suffering. But the law can help us here by preparing us for the human-ness of our death. It can restrain us from insisting on a death which will corrode the community’s commitment to care for the elderly and the sick. It can restrain our tendency to see the aging population as an accounting problem. It can restrain us from investing far too much moral authority in the medical profession, under the illusion that men and woman of science deal only in tangible facts. It can restrain us from on insisting on a right to die which comes at the cost of another’s right to stay alive.

The pressure on the sick, the disabled and the dying is already there. We cannot, as those who are schooled in the gospel of Jesus Christ, commit to a policy which deepens their abandonment, nor can we commend it to our community.

Friday, April 08, 2011

Thursday, April 07, 2011

Sublime Depravity - Human nature and the arts IV

What might humans “do” with the arts? Will we be wasting our time in creating art or thinking about it when “the time is short”? Will art have a diverting or even corrupting influence on us, leading us to idolatry or immorality? Surely not. Art is a good part of God’s good creation; the freedom, ability and materials necessary to produce art are his gifts. Yet, like everything created, it is in bondage to decay as a result of sin (Rom 8:20-1). The effect of Christ’s work is not just a return to the way things were, but promises a transformation of creation (Rev 21:5). However, that redeemed people are satisfied with cosy banality when they have a foretaste of such splendours is bewildering and disappointing. Having glimpsed eternity in the resurrection of Jesus, will we not be more aware of that which demeans our humanity? As we reform our bodies in conformity with their heavenly destiny, so oughtn’t we to reform our imaginations in line with Paul’s evocation of the true, honourable, just, pure, pleasing, commendable and praiseworthy in Phil 4:8? In the best hymns, for example, are united words that are neither merely theologically correct nor trite but rich and evocative with music that serves those who sing it by lifting their spirits in glorifying God. Neither sentimentality nor mere formalism have a place. The Christian hope gives us confidence there is in the arts potential for real communication and pleasure. The Christian hope gives us a grasp of reality that richly informs discussions of the arts. The Christian hope speaks of God’s judgement, and thus allows for a thorough critique of the abuses of art. The Christian hope also draws our imaginations to Christ. There is then every good reason for a Christian delight in the arts. Indeed, for Christians to maintain that there is a real joy in the arts glorifies God. Far from wasting time, they are (potentially) a redemption of time. The arts, created and experienced under the fear of God, have, like sex, their own peculiar ecstatic holiness.

Wednesday, April 06, 2011

Sublime Depravity - Human nature and the arts III


Can art be a “redeeming of the disorder mirroring God’s redeeming work in Christ”? Could creative endeavour be a part of the re-creation? There is a danger in speaking as if the arts in themselves extend Christ’s work, or as if artistic “inspiration” could be akin to “sanctification”. However, we can view human art as anticipatory. When order is wrested from the hands of chaos in a work of art, may we not catch a glimpse of the final goal of creation? The human imagination knows that something is not right with the present world. Art can turn us in the direction of a perfection we do not possess. The Christian is aided by the theme of Sabbath, which encapsulates this tension: while being a chance for enjoyment of God’s creation, it is also a reminder of the future “rest” not yet attained, but promised in Christ. There is no natural theology in the human arts; but the arts may display inklings of what Christians know and worship. In his speech at the Areopagus in Acts 17, Paul is able to take the words of a pagan poet - “For we too are his offspring” - as his text. Even art such as Francis Bacon’s - which explicitly denies God - is still asking the God-question.

Of course, I can also hear Karl Barth’s thundering “Nein!” Barth was emphatic that there was no relation at all between the arts and theology. And yet his love of Mozart’s music led him to make the astonishing claim that the composer should hold a “place in theology, especially in the doctrine of creation and in eschatology” . He wrote in the context of a discussion of the “shadowside” of creation, thinking of finitude and all its effects. Barth heard in Mozart an expression of the goodness of creation, including its limits; and that “creation praises its Master and is therefore perfect.” This is in harmony with the Wisdom literature. Inklings of God are present in the human arts (just as they are in nature); the Christian has been given the eyes to see them. The musical, poetic and painterly renditions of the human condition may take us to the “very threshold of transcendence and the theological;” but it is only encounter with Christ that takes us over it. Works of art are altars to an Unkown God - the God that makes himself known in the glory of the incarnate Word.

Tuesday, April 05, 2011

Sublime Depravity - Human nature and the arts II

In thinking theologically about the arts we will be naturally attracted to the doctines of creation, humanity, and revelation. But it must be stated from the outset that all of these have a disctinctive Christ-shape in true Christian thought; so that we will need to bring Christ to bear at every point of our discussion. Creation is dependent on God - but is not God. The doctrine of the Trinity helps to explain how God may relate to the world and yet not be the world. Further, unity and diversity are both true aspects of the created order. Humanity is given a unique role in the creation as the divine viceroy. Creation was not created “perfect” in some Parmenidean sense, but “very good”. It was in need of subduing, naming and enjoying. Human beings were given the capacity to imagine, to describe, to exercise choice; and to become second-order creators, working to shape God’s creation according to these gifts. John Calvin even went as far as to say that the human capacity for art is innate. Built into the structure of the world was the Sabbath, a rest for humans from their work. Art is a part of the subduing, naming and enjoying of God’s world: it interacts with creation and gives it order and new significance. The incarnation further reminds us that matter is not intrinsically evil. Conversely, the Christian doctrine of creation does not allow the human being to worship the creation, even when he or she makes it into art. The wisdom literature of the Old Testament explores the relationship of man and woman to God and to creation. “The fear of Yahweh” is the principle which explains both the freedom and the limit of human wisdom. On the one hand, humble service of and deference to the mighty creator and sustainer of the cosmos enables a person to comprehend experience, because it recognises divine order. There is no sacred/secular division - all the world is God’s. On the other hand, the phrase is a reminder of the limits placed on human wisdom. It recognises the hubris of men and women, and rebukes it. Above all, Jesus Christ provides the model of true human wisdom; and as Paul explains (1 Cor 1-2), Christ’s cross is the wisdom of God in action, confounding proud human wisdom. “The fear of Yahweh”, then, provides a useful motto for discussion of the arts. Christology declares the radical fallenness of the world—the miracle of the incarnation illustrates the depth of the despair. Goodness, beauty and truth are disrupted. Ugliness and disorder arise. While God’s order remains, humanity’s contact with that order is tenuous. However, the advent of Jesus Christ points us beyond the fall to the reconciliation of all things in Christ. The world, which was made through Christ, runs to the order of Christ. As art eloquently explains, human society is troubled by death. Christ’s resurrection from the dead points to the end of death’s rule and to the future transformation of the present order. The testimony of the Apostles is to the resurrected Christ’s Lordship over the world. What occurs in Christ is a re-creation - a new humanity is formed, by the Holy Spirit, in the present age. This is a people with imaginations re-formed as hope in Christ. They experience a present resurrected reality (John 10:10, Col 3:1-5); and they anticipate the perfecting of their bodies by godly obedience expressed in service. Here is the beauty of holiness, rather than the holiness of beauty. A similar kind of inversion is achieved in the pattern of God’s work in Christ. The image and glory of divinity itself, Christ emptied himself of all claims to equality with God, and submitted himself to the ugliness of the cross. Isaiah wrote of the Suffering Servant: “ - so marred was his appearance, beyond human semblance, and his form beyond that of mortals -” (52:14). The cross is a moment of grotesque ugliness; and yet also it is moment when a restoration of beauty is wrought. Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar compared faith to an aesthetic contemplation of the God’s work in the world. What God has done in redemption through Christ is itself a work of art, and one that counters proud human ideas of beauty. The doctrine of revelation points to the Christ’s uniqueness as God’s Word. Both visual and verbal descriptions are used of him: he is the “Word” and the “image” of God (John 1, Col 1). The arts then, do not contain of themselves a revelation, however they might mimic it. Yet given the success of God’s communicative act in Christ, we can have confidence that there is an order to creation and that are more than merely arbitrary meanings in art. Ultimately, the cosmos, though marked by sin, is a coherent realm in which meaningful artistic interactions may take place.

Monday, April 04, 2011

Sublime Depravity - Human nature and the arts I


Dorothy Sayers once wrote:

The Church as a body has never made up her mind about the Arts, and it is hardly too much to say that she has never tried. She has, of course, from time to time puritanically denounced the Arts as irreligious and mischievous, or tried to exploit the Arts as a means to the teaching of religion and morals....And there had...been plenty of writers on aesthetics who happened to be Christians, but they seldom made any consistent attempt to relate their aesthetic to the central Christian dogmas.

The goal of this paper is take up Sayer’s challenge by attempting to relate the arts to the major themes of the Christian faith. By “the arts” I mean the whole gamut of human imaginative and creative activity, including literary, musical, architectural, theatrical, visual, and even televisual arts. Art involves the imaginative arrangement and presentation of matter, such as words, or paint, or notes. It is universal and ubiquitous—no human society is without some form of art, and virtually no human being would live out of contact with art. The arts are held to engender an aesthetic response, meaning that something more than a merely sensory or intellectual or even emotional may be felt when we experience art.

Like work, art is cursed. As Nicholas Wolterstorff writes:

Art is not isolated from the radical fallenness of our nature. It is an instrument of it. Art does not lift us out of the radical evil of our history but plunges us into it. Art is not man’s saviour but a willing accomplice in our crimes.

The human imagination reveals its own fallenness in its art. Not only do inherently corrupt forms of art—blasphemy, pornography, idolatry, kitsch, propaganda—proliferate; but our expressions of order are subject to chaos, and our hopes are subject to despair. And yet the arts have the capacity to elevate us, to provide some of our most glorious moments, to show us most in tune with ourselves and the world, even to give us inklings of the divine. As within man and woman themselves, there remains the tension between the potential both for great beauty and also great vileness.
The Christian response to the arts has been likewise rather ambivalent, for several reasons. First, the strength of the second commandment has been taken as a warning against depictions of the divine. Christ is the only true image (eikon) of God (Col 1:15): our imaginations are not permitted liberty concerning Him.


Second, the gospel mission (because “the time is short”) holds an absolute precedence over artistic activity. The old created order is beyond redemption (it is said) and will soon be exposed to fire. The human arts have no eternal value; so that they are not worth cultivating.

Third, since art often involves the outward expression of the inward state of the human psyche, evangelical Christians, who have a strong doctrine of inner sinfulness, may well fear what such expression reveals. That is, the public projection in art of inner depravity may draw a censorious response, rather than an intelligently engaged one, from conservative Christians.


Fourth, Protestant evangelicals have displayed a suspicion of metaphor and representation—which are central to the arts—perhaps derived from the priority of the sensus literalis in scripture reading.

Fifth, as the religious and the aesthetic are felt by some modern theologians to be responses to the same thing, more orthodox Christians have recoiled from the arts. Paul Tillich saw in art an revelatory expression of the “Ultimate Concern”. The beautiful is also holy and transcendent. For Tillich, art and theology both touch on what really “is”. Certainly, modern artists such as Wassily Kandinsky and Marc Rothko have painted as if this was the case. However, for those who would uphold the Christ revealed in the scriptures as God’s unique revelation, Tillich’s claim for art is extremely unsatisfactory. But what is to be said, thought and felt about the arts if what is said is to be theologically accurate?

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

Love and Loss

Tennyson’s doubt is in many ways very contemporary. Like us, he was stunned and exhilarated by the pace of technological change. The power of experimental and observational science to explain the natural world seemed to make God somewhat surplus to requirements. The traditional concept of God was, so it seemed, redundant. The rationalistic philosophy of the age, when applied to biblical studies and to theology more generally, did much to erode confidence in a verbal revelation of God given in a propositional form.

But this did not, then as now, lead to a decline in religious belief as such. Rather, it sought out new forms. If religious faith could not be established by reason, perhaps experience might provide an alternative channel to the divine. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, theologians began to emphasise the more mystical and experiential aspects of Christian faith. Religious dogmas were not to be taken as direct descriptions of realities but rather as metaphors for encounters with the divine. Though people like Tennyson did not feel that they could any longer accept Christian orthodoxy, they were reluctant to pursue pure atheism. There was inside them a deep conviction that there was something transcendent. Not that they could name it, or give it a face – they could only grope towards it in the dark.

And then there was the experience of love and loss. Perhaps the Victorians in their time, before the wide acceptance of Darwinian views, were more ready to sanctify these powerful feelings. They seemed to come from some extra-phenomenal source; to be an intimation of immortality. We are more ready to see the pains and joys of human fellowship as demanded of us by our biological selves than as evidence of a holiness beyond us. Nevertheless, the popular sense of the ‘spiritual’ remains in many people, and permeates these moments at which heart is most evidently exposed. It is in our most intimate relationships that we feel most connected to the truth about who we are as individuals and most certain about our steps into the world; and we have the gratifying experience of being able to provide this for others. The reciprocity of human relationships take us beyond ourselves to ourselves.

Death remained the final, impermeable barrier. Poets of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries like John Donne certainly feared death as the curtailment of love and the rotting of the human body. Death was a demonic, personified figure who stalked his victims. Donne needs to draw on all the resources of his Christian faith to repudiate it in ‘Death be not proud’. But the grieving of the nineteenth century wails in a different key – one that we moderns more readily recognise. The loss is not felt as the result of being tyrannised by a sinister force. It is now a brute fact in a remorseless universe which is governed only by a God who remains unmoved at the plight of the creatures who experience it. To face death or to grieve is not be part of a dramatic struggle in which Mordor has temporarily got the upper hand. It is at least possible to express anger against that force. Death for a Tennyson and for we his twenty-first century descendants is sad and bewildering. It flaps its wings in the face of our confidence in human technological mastery of the world.

I falter where I firmly trod: Tennyson and doubt



Alfred Tennyson was indeed a striking young man, over six feet tall and powerfully built. The mass of his somewhat unkempt black hair was set upon a noble head. His face carried an intense expression of melacholy.

The son of a gloomy Lincolnshire clergyman, he arrived at Cambridge in 1827 already an accomplished and precocious poet. The Somersby rectory had been a dysfunctional household to say the least, with the eleven children largely left to amuse themselves by wandering around the local marshes and fens. If Tennyson was shy at first, his prodigious ability and intensity of personality soon attracted others; and he found some companionship in an intellectual society known as ‘The Apostles’.

In Tennyson’s second year at Cambridge, another young man arrived at the University who would become the kind of intimate friend that his childhood had lacked. His name was Arthur Hallam, the son of a leading historian and scholar, and in his own way remarkably gifted. In the cynicism of the times in which we live, we have lost the ability to talk about the power and the depth of friendship without hinting at some sexual overtone.

There was no hint of anything erotic in the relationship between the two men. That would be to miss just how profound the intimacy of their friendship became as a friendship. Indeed, Hallam became engaged to Tennyson’s sister Emily. They shared not in an amorous passion, but in the delights of intellectual discovery and in the vigorous discussion of any topic they could think of. They shared with one another their difficulty they found at maintaining religious belief and yet the sense of loss they felt in not believing. Criticism of the text of the Bible and scientific discoveries about the age of the earth had appeared to challenge the faith of many of the best minds at Cambridge; and Tennyson and Hallam were no different. Certainly nothing in Tennyson’s upbringing at the rectory would have commended Christian faith to him as anything but a burden to be borne.

The summer of 1833 began with Hallam spending time at the Tennyson home in rural Lincolnshire, in the English midlands. These were memorable weeks – a sweet time that Tennyson would always remember with some sense of pain because they were never to be repeated. In August, Hallam’s father took him on a journey to the European continent. On Sept 15th, Henry Hallam returned to his hotel in Vienna only to discover his son in an armchair, dead of a cerebral haemorrhage.

The blow this struck to Tennyson was overwhelming. His grandson, Sir Charles Tennyson, would later write:

The sudden extinction of his friend, with all his infinite capacity for affection and his brilliant promise, struck at the very roots of his will to live. Could it really be that all this great spiritual treasure was annihilated: that all human love and all man’s spiritual effort are but a momentary ripple on the ocean of eternity? Was the world wholly without purpose and man an irresponsible toy for the gigantic forces of Nature? If so, what value could there be in life?

If you have ever had a chance to walk about a Victorian graveyard you will be struck by the openness and even sentimentality with which they regarded death. We are not unlike them, in that terrible griefs affect us too. But we have less experience of them, and fewer words with which to express our loss. We are not given to the public elaboration of our feelings – we do not feel that anyone would be interested in our thoughts about the brevity of life and the nearness of our mortality.

But Tennyson was to make an art form of grieving. He was too sorrowed to attend the funeral, and did not visit Hallam’s tomb until after he was married. But he could not stop his pen:
Tears, idle tears, I know not what they mean,
Tears from the depth of some divine despair
Rise in the heart and gather to the eyes,
In looking on the happy Autumn-fields,
And thinking of the days that are no more.

Dear as remembered kisses after death,
And sweet as those by hapless fancy feigned
On lips that are for others; deep as love,
Deep as first love, and wild with all regret;
Death in Life, the days that are no more.

The poem which made Tennyson’s career as a poet, In Memoriam A.H.H., is a lengthy reflection on the death of his friend which did not appear for seventeen further years. It is a poem of grief at the loss of a dear friend. But it also a poem about the pain of losing faith. Tennyson was one of the great doubters of his age. His was still very much a Christianised society, and in general traditionally orthodox Christian views held sway. However, developments in astronomy and geology had seemed to contradict Biblical cosmology as it had been traditionally understood. The world was not new, but rather very, very ancient. The universe was far more vast than had been previously imagined. It seemed less and less that humankind occupied anything like a significant place in that universe. If humankind felt small, and lonely, there was at the same time an optimism about human technological progress. This was the age of the industrial revolution, of the steam engine and the factory. People still wanted to believe, but wanted to do so in all sincerity given what they now knew about the world. Was there a way forward for them?
Added to this for Tennyson was the personal existential crisis occasioned by the loss of his friend. It seemed to be exactly the kind of random occurrence that would characterise a heartless universe. And yet, he was not ready to give up on faith entirely. Here’s a passage from In Memoriam:

I falter where I firmly trod,
And falling with my weight of cares
Upon the great world's altar-stairs
That slope thro' darkness up to God,

I stretch lame hands of faith, and grope,
And gather dust and chaff, and call
To what I feel is Lord of all,
And faintly trust the larger hope.

All that is happening and all that has happened to him has led to uncertainty. His feet now ‘falter’, where once before he had been confident of his footfall upon the ground of faith. His ‘weight of cares’ – primarily his deep sense of loss for his friend – causes him to fall upon the ‘world’s altar-stairs’. The picture reminds me of the burden Christian carries in John Bunyan’s great Christian classic Pilgrim’s Progress. Only this burden is not the poet’s sin, but rather his ‘weight of cares’. The path to God (a stairway to heaven?) is shrouded in darkness. He is not yet ready to declare that this is a road to nowhere, to cite the Talking Heads. But all he can do is reach out his ‘lame hands of faith, and grope’. He can have no certainty about what he is reaching for, but only in the end a faint trust. The ‘dust and chaff’ that gathers suggests the dust to which Adam is told he will return in Genesis 3 on account of the curse. It is a mark of mortality and an intimation of death. The poet calls, not to a personal God who reveals himself in the traditional and Biblical sense, but rather to ‘what I feel is Lord of all’. Who or what is this dark divinity, shrouded in mystery and unknowability? He hopes for a hand to reach out to meet his groping arm, but with no confidence, however much he wishes it. What is the ‘larger hope’? He doesn’t quite know, other than to say that hope is, perhaps inexplicably, part of his experience too.
Tennyson became famous through this poem because its themes of grief, loss and doubt resonated deeply with his Victorian contemporaries. The twentieth century poet T.S. Eliot wrote of In Memoriam: 'It is not religious because of the quality of its faith, but because of the quality of its doubt.’ It was profound in the honesty with which it faced the most difficult and personal questions of all – to do with love and death.

Tennyson was unshaken in his conviction that his friend had lived on in some form; and he never
rejected belief in the existence of God. One of his last poems was the famous ‘Crossing the Bar’, an expression of hope at life’s end:

Twilight and evening bell,
And after that the dark!
And may there be no sadness of farewell,
When I embark;

For tho' from out our bourne of Time and Place
The flood may bear me far,
I hope to see my Pilot face to face
When I have crossed the bar.

But despite believing in the immortality of the soul and in his ‘Pilot’, it could never be said that he was an orthodox Christian believer in any sense. That conviction had long been shaken loose from him in his sorrows.

The atheists are right

My piece at Anglican Media this week

Monday, March 14, 2011

Seeking Common Ground

In debating the issue of same-sex marriage on Facebook recently, a journalist friend of mine stated that he had not found any ‘convincing non-religious arguments’ that would prevent a change to the marriage act.

‘Non-religious arguments’: it sounds like a reasonable requirement for any public discussion, doesn’t it? The argument goes something like this. I am certainly free to hold views based on entirely religious reasons; but when I step into the public square, I must shed these and speak in an entirely non-religious way if I am to convince. I might believe that left-handed people ought to be banned from public transport because an angel told me, but in seeking to convince others of this view I need to leave the angels behind and argue on an angel-free basis. Otherwise I am simply attempting to ‘impose my views on others’.

Former British PM Tony Blair encountered this resistance to public religious speech a number of times. He was once told by his spin doctor Alastair Campbell, when he was about to talk about his Christian faith in an interview with Vanity Fair, that ‘we don’t do God’. Later, when Blair said that he was ultimately answerable to God for commanding the invasion of Iraq, he was met with a withering barrage of attacks from media pundits who were alarmed that this might mean a somehow unjustifiable intrusion of the religious into the political at the highest level.

The alarmed reaction that Blair experienced is not because these ‘religious’ reasons are not convincing to many people. Plainly, religious reasons do have an enormous power to convince many people, even in the UK and Australia. Evoking the ‘image of God’, for example, is an extremely powerful component in an argument for social equality. It was heard frequently on the lips of Archbishop Desmond Tutu in the years of apartheid. When the leaders of the mainline churches speak, it is evident that they are given a hearing – if not always by the media, then certainly by the wider public. They can in fact openly appeal to the Bible or to theological ideas as part of their public utterances. If they want to get their point across to many people they need not, it seems, have one way of speaking in the cloister and another in the plaza .

It is not then because of lack of effectiveness that there is an appeal to trade only in ‘non-religious’ reasoning. Rather the opposite: the fear is that these religious arguments are all too effective. But it seems as if religious arguments are not open to the kind of scrutiny that non-religious ones are. They cannot convince the non-religious, and so they are imposed (if they can be) by majorities, or by noisy minorities. Secularists want to object that even if these reasons are compelling to lots of people they are illegitimately used as public reasons.

I think three particular questions are worth putting in response to the claim that public reasons ought always to be ‘non-religious’. First: is it in fact the case that the line between ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ is as easy to determine as it sounds? An argument based on a passage of the Bible, for example, sounds as if it is obviously going to fall into the ‘religious’ (and therefore illegitimate) camp. But you could easily make a case that the Bible has an historic moral authority in Western culture, government and law quite apart from any sense that it is the revealed Word of God, as orthodox Christians hold. For example, an appeal to Jesus’ teaching to ‘love your neighbour as yourself’ would be entirely acceptable to most people in a public debate. Would such an appeal amount to a ‘non-religious’ reason? Or is it ‘religious’?

Conversely, when a politician makes an appeal to ‘Australian values’ or to ‘the ANZAC spirit’, are these not ‘religious’ claims? When they speak in this way, they draw on a mythology about the past that is not subject to quantification or contradiction in an economic or scientific sense. They are appealing to a sense of civic piety that is arguably every bit as religious as the public utterances of a bishop. In fact, the original meaning of the word ‘religious’, which comes from the Latin word religare (‘to bind, fasten’), had everything to do with the sorts of public duties and civic values of Rome to which the citizenry were bound. ‘Religion’ in this sense is very much part of the public space.

Second: are ‘religious’ arguments so hermetically-sealed that they are not in fact open to challenge and counter-claim from those who do not share them? In many cases, the secular commentator feels quite happy to intervene in religious discourse. As an example we could cite the judgement frequently offered in the media that there are ‘fundamentalist’ Muslims or Christians, and that this is a bad form of religion. From a secular standpoint commentators feel that it is legitimate to criticise the wearing of the burqa or female circumcision (for example).
What’s more, arguments that religious people put forward are not usually as simplistic as ‘an angel told me’, despite the way in which they are often portrayed. Each of the Christian denominations, for example, is in possession of extensive traditions of reasoning from their foundational principles and dogmas – reasoning which is in principle available to be understood and debated by others, especially when it is used to make arguments in favour of this or that public policy. That is not to say that there won’t be significant and passionate disagreement on what constitutes a valid argument, but an argument is better than silence.

If the first two questions were an appeal to secularists to relax a bit about ‘religious’ reasoning into public debate, the third question is one for the Christian church: is it not the case that we owe our neighbours a ‘reason for the hope that is within you?’ (1 Peter 3:15). In other words: in public debate, victory isn’t everything. We could simply say: it is not worth discussing the matter, since enough people accept our point of view without explanation in any case. This is how a lot of politics gets done, unfortunately. I think this would be an unacceptable abuse of the public space. Secularists may not agree with the reasons that we put forward, but it honours the sanctity (if I may use such theological language!) of the process of public debate about our common life if we at least seek to persuade those with whom we disagree.

Friday, March 11, 2011

Overcome with emotion?


In October 2004, my mother-in-law died of breast cancer at the age of 62, not much more than a year after being diagnosed. Being the only member of the family experienced at public speaking – and indeed, at running funerals - I was quite willing to take on the duties of giving the eulogy at the funeral service when I was asked to by my father-in-law. In addition, since I was Jackie’s son-in-law and not directly related to her, I could be expected and indeed expected myself to maintain my composure in the delivery of the task in a suitably controlled tone, allowing the mourners to grieve in quiet privacy.

The tears, then, took me quite by surprise. I was not far into retelling Jackie’s life story – from her childhood in London to her arrival in Australia in the 1960s and her conversion to faith in Christ. At some point in this narrative, I was quite overcome by the occasion. My voice quavered; I could feel myself flushing red; and my face contorted itself. I could barely continue to read, because I couldn’t see the page in front of me. What words I could get out were squeezed out through my throat, and I found myself gasping for breath in between watery sobs. Afterwards my six year old son said to me ‘your face was all screwed up, Dad’.


I retell this story not because I am hoping to elicit sympathy but rather because of its ordinariness as an episode of the human emotions at work. The strong emotion seemed to come to me in a way that I couldn’t predict. It was as if there were a force outside of me working on me and causing me to lose self-control of my body in a way that was understandable but still within Anglo-Saxon culture somewhat shameful, especially for men. I am not normally conscious of doing things with my body that I don’t directly will. Yet in this moment, normal operations seemed to be suspended and the emotion took control of me.


It is an ordinary episode, but no less complicated for being so. It illustrates how troublesome emotions are in thinking cohesively about human being. This difficulty pans out in three overlapping ways, to do with agency, the body and reason.


The first difficulty is best explained by asking: in what sense was I an agent of my own sobs? Can I really speak in this way, of an emotion controlling me, since the emotion could not be anyone else’s? The sobs certainly emanated from my mouth and in my voice. They happened to and in my body. But I was not intending or willing to sob; in fact, I was willing the opposite. Yet I sobbed, and not some demon that had entered me, or some ventriloquist pretending to be me.
Second, at the moment of intense emotion, the human being seems to become almost alienated from his own body. Because these emotions are exhibited in such an obviously visceral fashion and yet carry with them unwanted consequences such as the stigma of cultural shame, the human subject may feel that ‘I’ am other from my physical body. There must be then a purer, non-physical form of ‘me’ – to which perhaps I can ascend once I am free of the untrustworthiness of my flesh. Even a more honourably perceived emotion like the feeling of loss shares enough in common with the more base desires of our bodies – feelings like hunger, sexual desire, need for sleep – that in experiencing it we still frequently experience this otherness from our bodies. Indeed, if I am to speak of some ‘higher’ set of emotions, where do I ‘feel’ them if not in my body?


Third, my perception of myself as a primarily rational creature is disturbed by the experience of strong emotion. But this is because of a hidden assumption that ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ are discrete centres of my person, with reason the more nearly ‘spiritual’ or more distinctly human of the two. Yet my strong emotion was in fact tied to rational propositions about the occasion. I did not feel at all the same way about the funeral, at which I had ministered, for a woman in her early forties who had committed suicide even though the circumstances were arguably more tragic. I knew Jacky as my friend and mother-in-law, and as my wife’s mother and the granny of my own children. I could calculate what her loss would mean for us. In fact, the more I thought about it, the more I felt about it.

These difficulties are enough to engender a philosophical, psychological and anthropological discussion of the emotions, such as philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum provides in her masterful work Upheavals of Thought – The Intelligence of the Emotions. The task of a theological anthropology, however, is to begin analysing questions like this in the light of a particular context, namely God. For a Christian anthropology, that context is framed by the themes of the creation of man and woman in the image of God on the one hand and the presence of sin in human life on the other. These two themes are set in tension with one another not just in the Biblical story, but in the existence of every human person. To what degree is this or that feature of my humanity reflect my likeness as a creature made in the divine image to the creator? Or is it in some way a result of that disorder of personhood that stems from my participation in human fallen-ness? But Christian anthropology will also speak of a destiny for human beings. The two themes of theological anthropology have their resolution however in the person and work of Jesus Christ. Theological anthropology, like all properly Christian theology, must speak an evangelical word, in which the image of God humankind is redeemed and perfected. It has, in the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, a pattern to which human creatures will one day be conformed (Rom 8:29).

Returning to my troublesome emotions, then: was this event God’s will for creatureliness in me? If God has no ‘body, parts or passions’, and yet my emotions are an irreducibly physical component of me, ought I in seeking to be more like him look to some future beyond or without my body? Or must I think of myself dualistically, as most of the Christian tradition has done, having a distinct ‘soul’ for the purer emotions like joy and hope as well as a body for my appetites like hunger and thirst? Has ‘reason’, or the ‘rational soul’ a more exalted seat in me? What would an account of the human emotions look like in the light of the resurrection of the dead? In what sense can the three problematic aspects of human emotion – to do with agency, body and reason – be addressed from a theological perspective?

Thursday, March 03, 2011

How to destroy a human being

In 2004 a series of images seeped out into the world’s media that seemed to emerge from the pit of hell itself. Abu Ghraib prison had been known, under the rule of Saddam Hussein, as the closed door behind which the very worst of his terrors was carried out. By now in the hands of the conquering US military, it was evident that the means and methods of prisoner treatment had not significantly changed. The pictures revealed that a programme of torture, rape, abuse and humiliation was part of the experience of daily life at Abu Ghraib under US control.
It is the unselfconsciousness of the images that is perhaps what is so disturbing about them. They look like a series of holiday snaps – the toothy grins and thumbs-up gestures of the US guards point to the camaraderie they were evidently feeling in their shared experience. They seem utterly detached from the prisoners whom, by complete contrast, lie prone and passive or cringe in terror. They recoil from the lunges of dogs. They stand masturbating while a female guard watches and points. They lie in naked pyramids of flesh. They hang by their chained wrists from the bars of their cells. In one image, a hooded Iraqi prisoner stands elevated on a box with his arms outstretched. His fingers are attached by metal clips to wires. He is clearly under the impression that the wires are electrified, and that he is about to experience extreme pain and possibly death.

Torture is usually the most secret of acts, usually concealed from the world by the thickness of prison walls. Torturers do not like to put their work on their public record. Though posing the prisoners for photographs as if they were some tourist attraction seemed to be part of the torture itself, it was also a naïve mistake. It revealed what was meant to be kept hidden. Here finally we could catch a glimpse of the torturers craft from the inside. It made the world witnesses to their work, and led to the shame and imprisonment of the perpetrators – if not those who ordered them to carry out a ‘hard’ interrogation.

There was also in the revelation of the photographs in the western media the shocking realisation that the torturers were not operating at the behest of a Saddam or a Mugabe or a Pinochet, but were the representatives of a modern, liberal western democracy. The self-image of westerners as enlightened and reasonable people was shattered. In fact, democracies have not ever ceased to deploy torture as a method. In his book Torture and Democray, US-Iranian political scientist Darius Rejali shows how even modern democracies have used torture – those regimes that describe themselves as humane and supportive of human rights. The terrible secret at the heart of democratic regimes is that even in the name of humanity we led to destroy the human – an act that is ultimately self-destructive. As the Vatican foreign minister Archbishop Giovanni Lajolo said: ‘The torture? A more serious blow to the United States than September 11, 2001 attacks. Except that the blow was not inflicted by terrorists but by Americans against themselves.’ Attempts to isolate the prison guards Lynndie England and Charles Graner from the military hierarchy and to depict them as uneducated and Southern were a predictable response from the media and the judiciary to the possibility of a general complicity in the acts that were depicted in the photographs.

As the Abu Ghraib photographs reveal, in torture bodily pain is only one aspect of the process and interrogation for information is only one of the goals. In fact, torture involves the deconstruction and dismemberment of the human person – which is both its overriding purpose and its means. In his remarkable book Torture and Eucharist US theologian Cavanaugh cites the case study of Arturo, a torture victim of the Pinochet regime in Chile. Arturo told his therapist: ‘I feel as though I were not myself’ (p. 41).

Thus, in torture we can observe in a chilling way a kind of negative anthropology: the torturer has to tacitly acknowledge what a human being is, in order to pull him apart. Evil speaks a kind of truth - in order to undo it, it has to acknowledge it. In torture we have a perverse revelation of the human in the attempt to make her disappear. The horror of torture shows us how vulnerable a human is, too: that our bodily life places us in the path of circumstances that may separate us from ourselves.

Wednesday, March 02, 2011

Is Ned Flanders a Violent Man?

For Australian readers, my piece 'Is Ned Flanders a Violent Man?' has been published in Quadrant magazine.