The locus classicus of Thomas’ doctrine of Natural Law is the six articles of 1a2ae, 94. The Natural Law he describes as a habitus, because it is present in the human conscience or synderesis; it “stays always in man” (semper in homine manet). The question of how Natural Law is known by the human subject is a vexed one worthy of further discussion; suffice to say that the Natural Law is the underlying assumption behind human moral discourse. It may be termed a habit not because it is a quality whereby one acts, but because it is steadily held. There is but one precept of Natural Law which Aquinas reveals by analogy with the basis of human apprehension in the real. Like the first principles of natural science, the first principles of practical reason are per se notum - “self-evident”. Practical reason first apprehends the good; thus the first precept of Natural Law, upon which all others are based is:
that good is to be done, evil to be avoided.
All drives of human nature, then, insofar as they can be “governed by reason” (regulantur ratione) are covered by Natural Law. The secondary precepts of Natural Law, which cover a vast range of human activity, derive from this primary command. Thomas tackles next the vexing problem of the universality of Natural Law. In theory, Natural Law must be universally applicable; but even cursory observation can identify the sheer diversity of human desires and behaviour. Aquinas’ solution is to point to the proper priority of the human intellect: humans may be blocked from knowledge of the good by “passion or bad custom or even by racial proclivity”; but all human inclinations should be governed by the intellect. Natural Law in the primary precept is immutable; but may be added to in the secondary precepts in special circumstances - by divine command, for example. It is the first, common precepts that, according to Aquinas, even the effects of sin cannot cancel in the human heart. Sin has effect on the secondary precepts up to a point. Human nature remains essentially sound despite sin: the human desire for virtue is blocked rather than corrupted at the source.
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Alongside this interesting blog, I’ve been rereading James Barr’s lectures (Gifford Lectures, 1991) on natural theology vis biblical sources. Barr remains parsimonious and restrained rather than metaphysically expansive in extracting natural theology memes out of biblical texts. Barr avoids Thomas’s sometimes metaphysical-rambling and contradictions (except in Barr’s excellent – my opinion – broad spectrum critique of Barth who Barr might characterize as one of the greatest theological mistakes of the 20th century because of Barth’s dogmatic rejection of natural theology - another matter). Curious that Strauss still enters here as a Thomas interpreter, that is, given Leo’s project of stripping away revelation by following after Heidegger muddling back to the pre-Socratics. As if some pre-revelational pristine state exists. Strauss could use a dose of Barr before discounting Thomas down in favor of some pristine pre-revelational chimera. Methinks.
The thing about Thomas (your quote) – “...In questions of theory, truth is the same for everybody, both as to principles and to conclusions ...” – is that I’d equivocate whether this proposition really is a matter of theory, or instead, is an empirical question convertible (potentially) into a testable hypothesis. Caveats below.
I know that various contemporary Thomas studies factor Thomas alternatively as a praxis-pragmatician or instead as a metaphysician; but, I see equivocation and confusion in Thomas on this matter.
The eternal law is a ratio (rational element) of the same divine providence which imprints the ratio of human rational participation in the divine rationality enabling humans to discern God’s law: both ratios by divine providence. So while I agree that it’s a “basic axiom” (the fundamental moral imperative) for Aquinas, it’s too hard tell conclusively whether “God imprints” (II, q.93) any ratio on the universe and correspondingly inwardly in us – as a matter of something that Thomas derives (say derives empirically) from observation or rather whether he derives this “axiom” from some confused modal logic (despite his rejection of natural-theological proofs for God) or whether Thomas just up and posits this axiom just like axioms were posited for maths (Euclid’s axioms had been around) just because these axioms work and despite the fact that Thomas could not formally or ontologically justify them (for us today, following Godel).
On this latter option, the “self-evident” language for Thomas would be dicta. Throat clearing. Worse, if Thomas anticipates Machiavellian elements, then he’s just fudging the relative weight of this self-evident “axiom” in order to avoid conflict with the weight of church hierarchy and authority. Leaving a mess for Galileo and company. An unhappier reading. So Strauss may yet be a good reading of Thomas because of his understanding of the necessary politics of fudging language to satisfy religious authority. Revelation or pre-revelation isn't the real issue. Maybe compromise is. Or, simple confusion.
I think Barr’s modesty and restraint in finding natural theology memes in scriptural texts applies somewhat to interpreting Aquinas in his medieval world.
Still – this “axiom” – a puzzle for me in Aquinas. But, fun. Worthwhile.
Cheers,
Jim
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