For Aquinas it is a basic axiom that we should do what is good - which he locates in terms of the natural and essential inclinations of human beings. The application of his general conclusions, such as individul survival or social harmony, are then outlined in increasing complexity, so that in the end by a coherent logic he can build an impressive moral edifice.
...In questions of theory, truth is the same for everybody, both as to principles and to conclusions, but only in those principles which are called [by Boethius] ‘common conceptions. In questions of action, however, practical truth and goodwill are not not the same for everybody with respect to particular decisions, but only with respect to common principles; and even those who are equally in the right on some particular course of action are not equally aware of how right they are.
Further, Aquinas distinguishes between the determinations and conclusions of Natural Law. Restitution of a victim, for example, is a conclusion of Natural Law; whereas the content of the restitution is merely its determination. Lastly, it is worth noting that while Aquinas is certainly no utilitarian, neither is his ethics purely deontological, as has been often assumed. The precepts of the Natural Law aim at the goodness of the end over (even) the goodness of the act performed. Where Aquinas differs from utilitarian thought is that he does ascribe intrinsic value to human actions, in a manner subordinate to the ends. In addition, the good which is the end is not merely defined in terms of human pleasure. In this way, Aquinas can argue teleologically that adultery, homosexuality, drunkenness, gluttony, suicide, murder, lying and promise-breaking are unnatural and therefore contrary to Natural Law.
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Alongside this interesting blog, I’ve been rereading James Barr’s lectures (Gifford Lectures, 1991) on natural theology vis biblical sources. Barr remains parsimonious and restrained rather than metaphysically expansive in extracting natural theology memes out of biblical texts. Barr avoids Thomas’s sometimes metaphysical-rambling and contradictions (except in Barr’s excellent – my opinion – broad spectrum critique of Barth who Barr might characterize as one of the greatest theological mistakes of the 20th century because of Barth’s dogmatic rejection of natural theology - another matter). Curious that Strauss still enters here as a Thomas interpreter, that is, given Leo’s project of stripping away revelation by following after Heidegger muddling back to the pre-Socratics. As if some pre-revelational pristine state exists. Strauss and Barth equally (for polar opposite reasons) could use a dose of Barr before discounting Thomas. Methinks.
The thing about Thomas (your quote) – “...In questions of theory, truth is the same for everybody, both as to principles and to conclusions ...” – is that I’d equivocate whether this proposition really is a matter of theory, or instead, is an empirical question convertible (potentially) into a testable hypothesis. Caveats below.
I know that contemporary Thomas studies factor Thomas alternatively as a praxis-pragmatician or instead as a metaphysician; but, I see equivocation and confusion in Thomas on this matter.
The eternal law is a ratio (rational element) of the same divine providence which imprints the ratio of human rational participation in the divine rationality enabling humans to discern God’s law: both ratios by divine providence. So while I agree that it’s a “basic axiom” (the fundamental moral imperative) for Aquinas, it’s too hard tell conclusively whether “God imprints” (II, q.93) any ratio on the universe and correspondingly inwardly in us – as a matter of something that Thomas derives (say derives empirically) from observation or rather whether he derives this “axiom” from some confused modal logic (despite his rejection of natural-theological proofs for God) or whether Thomas just up and posits this axiom just like axioms were posited for maths (Euclid’s axioms had been around) just because these axioms work and despite the fact that Thomas could not formally or ontologically justify them (for us today, following Godel).
On this latter option, the “self-evident” language for Thomas would be dicta. Throat clearing. Worse, if Thomas anticipates Machiavellian elements, then he’s just fudging the relative weight of this self-evident “axiom” in order to avoid conflict with the weight of church hierarchy and authority. Leaving a mess for Galileo and company. An unhappier reading. So Strauss may yet be a good reading of Thomas because of his understanding of the necessary politics of fudging language to satisfy religious authority. Making self-evident axioms bow down to who-says. So revelation or pre-revelation isn't the real issue. Maybe compromise is.
Or, just simple confusion.
And maybe on my part.
I think Barr’s modesty and restraint in finding natural theology memes in scriptural texts applies somewhat to interpreting Aquinas in his medieval world.
Still – this “axiom” – a puzzle for me in Aquinas. But, fun. Worthwhile.
Cheers,
Jim
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