Natural Law 6

At first glance, the doctrine of Natural Law has a great deal to commend it to the moral theologian. The scriptures themselves offer ample testimony, it would seem, to the presence of some kind of inward and general moral knowledge by which humanity understands the divine imperative. Budziszewski offers some dubious examples, but there are several valid references. There is the witness of the created order to the character of its creator (Ps 19:1-6; 104; Rom 1:20); and the conscience whereby the law is “written on their hearts” (Rom 2:14-15). Wisdom literature seems to allow the application of reason in the understanding of morality. Further, the judgement of God is pronounced on pagan nations throughout the Old Testament (for example on the Canaanites for necromancy in Dt 18:9-14) when no explicit specially-revealed divine decree pertains to them.

Natural lawyers like Budziszewski (and Tony Abbott!) defend Natural Law on the grounds of its use as an apologetic contact point with the non-Christian world. Natural Law gives us reason to be optimistic about moral and political discussions, because even if the non-Christian denies knowledge of right and wrong in Christian terms, we can assume (according to Budziszewski) that he or she is deliberately suppressing the truth. Natural Law addresses the human ethical condition from the level, not of knowledge, but of will. Knowledge is assumed.

Ironically, it is this very area of knowledge in which the Thomist doctrine of Natural Law is most vulnerable. The epistemological question must head a critique of the doctrine. Helmut Thielicke writes:

In this whole matter...what is involved is not an ontic, but a noetic problem.