Re-thinking the term “propositional revelation” or, What Broughton Knox Really Said.

The use of particular terminology in any given field is meant to clarify rather than obscure. Terms are only useful as far as they communicate accurately the concepts they signify. When, owing to shifts in culture or context, terminology becomes confusing, it should be abandoned or replaced. I don’t think any theologian would dispute that this is especially true in theological discourse.

I have noticed for some time now a confusion with the term “propositional revelation”, a term strongly associated with DB Knox (who defended it in a 1960 RTR article) and in common use amongst Sydney Anglicans. I wish to argue that this term badly distorts the doctrine of scripture that Sydney Anglicans actually uphold in practice – such that our critics and some of our students have entirely misunderstood what was meant by the original use of the term. It is time for us to revisit our use of this terminology, and I shall argue, abandon it. It is no longer communicating even what Dr Knox mean by it, as an examination of his 1960 article will show.

The word “propositional” has, of course, strong overtones of logical positivism. The logical positivists were a mid-twentieth century philosophical school associated with the early Wittgenstein, AJ Ayer and Karl Popper; and in very brief summary, they were interested to uncover from language the basic propositions and concepts, stripping away the formal and affective shell in which the nut of meaning was carried. Language, for all that it might be conveyed in poetic or narrative form, was reducible down to the simple propositions contained within it. What was needed was a systematic reduction of human knowledge to logical and scientific foundations: its basic propositions, in other words. With the passing of time, the logical positivists have faded from view and their approach discredited (rightly or wrongly), such that the application of the term “positivism” has the ring of the perjorative about it.

When applied to the idea of scriptural revelation, then, the term “propositional revelation” is understood by some to mean that the narrative or poetic or epistolary form of scripture is irrelevant to the actual meaning that it contains. These matters of genre or structure are merely the wrapping of the content of revelation which needs to be stripped away. In this understanding, “propositions” indicate something like “axioms”, or bare statements of literal fact.

We see this understanding of “propositional revelation” in Archbishop Peter Carnley’s recent book; and in Rev Humphrey Southern’s (appalling - over 20 plain errors of fact!) article in Theology 107/836. As he understands – from his interviews with Sydney Anglican leaders - Sydney theology
…starts with a small handful of propositions that are entirely axiomatic and shape with inevitable logic the whole of what follows. Fundamental to this theological method is the understanding that truth – theological truth as much as scientific – can only be expressed in terms of intellectual propositions. Neither narrative nor metaphor nor allegory can convey truth, though they can illustrate it or illuminate it. (p.120)
As Southern sees it, this leads to a distorted and unbalanced reading of scripture:
…The method also involves strict selectivity in how it allocates authority to Scripture. It is not merely that it affords greater authority to some passages over others, or some biblical writers over others, because of preference: it is the selectivity that says the parables of Jesus, because they are narrative and metaporical or allegorical, are inherently less capable of informing doctrine than propositions that may (however tendentiously) be drawn from some Pauline writings. (p.122)

This sadly reductionistic and emaciated understanding of scripture was nowhere taught to me in my studies at Moore College and is not now; nor do I see it (often) in practice in the pulpits of our churches. However, one increasing danger of the use of the term is that not only our critics but also our students – especially those of a scientific or pragmatic bent – will adopt it, thinking this is what the Sydney doctrine of revelation means for interpreting scripture. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is at least occasionally the case.

However, reading the 1960 article of DB Knox, it is obvious that this reductionistic meaning of the term is not what he meant. The article, written in Dr Knox’s clipped, almost terse, style, addresses then-fashionable idea that revelation is an event, and that the scripture merely witness verbally to the revealing event. The Scriptures, according the view Knox is contrasting with his own, are not the word of God but are reflections on the deeds of God in which he reveals himself. Not so, asserts Knox; revelation is propositional: that is, to say, to do with words and the concepts they express. He writes:
The denial of “propositional revelation” is the denial that God reveals himself to men through the medium of words, that is to say, through meaningful statements and concepts expressed in words, for such is the only sense that can be given to the word “propositional” in this phrase. (The Collected Works of DB Knox 1.308).
Words written meaningfully are, of course, propositions. (CW of DBK 1.309)

“Propositional” Knox defines broadly. In order to explain what he means by “propositional revelation”, Knox does not apply a kind of reductive exegesis, distilling unambiguous statements from all kinds of texts: rather he points to the texts themselves including the form in which they appear as propositional, because they are meaningfully verbal. For example:
One of the most important revelations through vision is Daniel’s vision of the Son of Man in Daniel 7. Both the vision itself, and the vital interpretation of it, cannot be described otherwise than as “propositional revelation.” (CW of DBK 1.311)

Knox did not want to tie the idea of inspiration too closely to the exact words on the page in the manner of the Qu’ran. Somehow, the concepts of scripture are translatable from one language into another, and yet still remain revelational. But Knox did not mean that the narrative or poetic form of the text was therefore merely a shell to be discarded in favour of the kernel of truth contain within it. My (I believe realised!) fear is that, though that is not what Knox or his followers mean by “propositional revelation”, it is what is being understood by it.
Knox’s article is admittedly modest, and it is more than forty years old. It addressed a particular controversy in theological discourse. A full-blown monograph on the Doctrine of Revelation now exists, written by PF Jensen. It continues the use of the term “propositional revelation”, but clearly does not mean by it what the critics (and some followers) assume it means. As he explains on p.87ff, “Christian revelation is basically verbal”, in that it conveys both relationship and information. In no way is this idea intended to surpass the affective or aesthetic dimension in the texts of scripture, as is borne out in the rest of the book.

So: do I have an alternative terminology to suggest? I am attracted to “verbal revelation”. However, the criticism of this suggestion is that it is not the words themselves but what they say that is the locus of the divine speech, so that the words of God may indeed be translated from one medium, form or language into another. I would respond that these translated forms – whether sermon, commentary or ESV – are only secondarily or derivatively the word of God. Something will always be lost in translation.

Perhaps there doesn’t need to be a replacement term: perhaps what this discussion reveals is that a simple word has obscured something that actually needs many words to explain accurately. In that instance, it is all the more urgent that we find out and then say what we mean by “the Bible is the word of God”.