Rushdie and evil, or is it good?

The problem, for Rushdie, apart from the savagery that he sees is the outcome of this way of thinking, is an epistemological one: how does one know that what is experienced as a revelation from God is in fact just that: from God? The novel tells of a moment in which Mahound/Muhammed himself was taken in for a time by the ‘Satanic Verses’ – verses of prophecy that in fact had a diabolical rather than divine source – undermines the terrible certainty with which religious believers assert their beliefs. God and/or Satan: which is it? Or is it both? In fact, may not both stem from the same origin? Rushdie puts these words in the mouth of a vision Gibreel has of Rekha Merchant, later in the novel:

This notion of separation of functions, light versus dark, evil versus good, may be straightforward enough in Islam…but go back a bit and you see that it’s a pretty recent fabrication. Amos, eight century BC, asks: “Shall there be evil in a city and the Lord hath not done it?” Also Jahweh, quoted by Deutero-Isaiah two hundred years later, remarks: “I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace and create evil; I the Lord do all these things.” It isn’t until the Book of Chronicles, merely fourth century BC, that the word shaitan is used to mean a being, and not only an attribute of God.’

This is a rather unlikely bit of biblical scholarship (which takes on the tone of an encyclopedia entry); but it illustrates what for Rushdie is so problematic in the religious worldview. It is impossible for the believer to be certain that the voice that she is hearing is that of the divinity and not that of some more sinister force; or that the God in whom she believes is not somehow to be found in two guises in any case. With more than a hint towards the classic philosophical problem of evil, Rushdie intimates that the religious believer has to accept, ultimately, that either that good and evil are both committed by the same God, or that the this God is not truly God in the way that the monotheist religions have imagined. But, more than that, good and evil are perhaps not so easily distinguished as the religious traditions have thought; it is not so easily a case of ‘us’ and ‘them’. The victim mentality, which accuses the other of evil on a diabolic scale, ignores the evil within; it does not admit the possibility of its own complicity in evil. Victims are also perpetrators, though this is an unpalatable truth; and this means that causes cannot be pursued in expectation of some triumphal, final vindication. Evil and good form a complex web in which human beings and communities are entangled with one another.