Fourth, the doctrine of Natural Law is at best “a very general moral outlook”. It has difficulty in showing how its basic principles may be translated into reliable and specific practical maxims. We may complain that the first precept is not self-evident but rather tautological. Once again, the sheer variety of outcomes in Natural Law thinking is evidence.
Fifth, does Natural Law give an adequate (in biblical terms) account of the distortion of human reason by sin? Barth fulminates:
...we cannot accept that merely relative and quantitative scope and significance of the fall, that doctrine of the nature of man which regards it as merely sick, dereanged and impotent, that talk of a remnant of the original divine image and likeness which remains in spite of the fall. This explains whu we have to object against Roman doctrine that...it misunderstands and distorts in the most dangerous way the seriousness of sin and therefore the seriousness of the human situation in relation to God.
On these grounds, Barth might allow a pre-lapsarian role for Natural Law; but the fall has so affected our human nature that even our reason is distorted. Brunner, in his earlier work, criticised Catholic ethical teaching as
not aware of this conception at all; for it is extremely unpalatable.
Of course, Thomas does account in part for the obfuscating power of sin. However, he views human nature as retaining its natural outline (pura naturalia); when not only our will, but our knowledge is corrupted by the effects of sin. Ultimately, Thomas’ anthroplogy is more in harmony with Aristotlean categories than scriptural principles.
1 comment:
Heroic rationalization using reason-in-his-system to make rational and reasonable all the many reasons for Barthian anti-reason rationality.
Barth the heroic rationalizer and reason-user. That Aquinas is more like Aristotle is to his credit because Thomas is eudaemonically (happily virtuous) and consciously so and Thomas credits the hand that feeds him.
That Barth is Plato-redux (more like a very bad version of Plato via Plotinus) is to Barth’s discredit because Barth is unreasonably ignorant of his cave of shadow and Barth is in denial of his every use of the most severe and punishing reason and is in denial of his blistering and parsimonious rationalizations which justify his idolatry of Platonic ideal form.
But then again, the very qualitative depth of sin in me makes me mistakenly and sinfully only think that Barth uses reason in its most severe and most punishing idealized form instead of just using special Barth-reason, so that I’m all the more perverse and lost. And of course, the great master said (“Evangelical Theology”) that his theological system is without presuppositions (“presuppositionless” if I recall) and so can’t be questioned.
Alas.
But cheers,
Jim
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