O'Donovan speaks mucho truth:
The foundations of Christian ethics must be evangelical foundations; or, to put it more simply, Christian ethics must arise from the gospel of Jesus Christ. Otherwise it could not be Christian ethics. Resurrection and Moral Order, p. 11
A belief in Christian ethics is a belif that certain ethical and moral judgements belong to the gospel itself; a belief, in other words, that the church can be commited to ethics without moderating the tone of its voice as a bearer of glad tidings. RMO p. 12
That is, the question has to be, how can we preach/do ethics, and at the same time preach the good news?
Wednesday, January 30, 2008
Fergus Kerr on Charles Taylor
Kerr's book Immortal Longings is a magnificent treatment of the subject of the self in contemporary philosophy and theology. Of Charles Taylor he says (rightly I think):
...Taylor insists that some explanatory frameworks give us a better sense of reality than others. True, it is not easy to judge one superior to another without appealing to epistemological foundations that stand outside all frameworks, or merely to list the technological achievements of Western science (say). There can be no going back on the lesson of modern philosophy: we have no access to sources of knowledge independently of whatever conceptual scheme we have in place. But pragmatic success is not a good enough criterion either: for one thing, what counts as success may vary from one society to another. p. 137
...Taylor insists that some explanatory frameworks give us a better sense of reality than others. True, it is not easy to judge one superior to another without appealing to epistemological foundations that stand outside all frameworks, or merely to list the technological achievements of Western science (say). There can be no going back on the lesson of modern philosophy: we have no access to sources of knowledge independently of whatever conceptual scheme we have in place. But pragmatic success is not a good enough criterion either: for one thing, what counts as success may vary from one society to another. p. 137
Can Morality Be Christian? John Milbank
I have only come lately to this essay by Milbank, and what a piece of provocation it is! The answer is, in short, no: morality cannot be Christian! It is quite a Protestant piece for him. He ends thus, with his best impersonation of Luther in full cry:
So no, the Christian man is not a moral man, not a man of good conscience, who acts with what he knows of death, scarcity and duty to totalities. He has a bad conscience, but a good confidence: for he acts ith what he does not know but has faith in. In absolute trust he gives up trying to be good, to sustain a right order of government within himself. The Romans that Paul wrote to did this already, but they still needed a letter from Paul - to hear what? Simply to hear the other, receive the other, and through the other receive the gratuitous God. Cease to be self-sufficient in the face of scarcity. Instead to be good as first receiving from the all-sufficiency of God, and acting excessively out of this excess.
So no, the Christian man is not a moral man, not a man of good conscience, who acts with what he knows of death, scarcity and duty to totalities. He has a bad conscience, but a good confidence: for he acts ith what he does not know but has faith in. In absolute trust he gives up trying to be good, to sustain a right order of government within himself. The Romans that Paul wrote to did this already, but they still needed a letter from Paul - to hear what? Simply to hear the other, receive the other, and through the other receive the gratuitous God. Cease to be self-sufficient in the face of scarcity. Instead to be good as first receiving from the all-sufficiency of God, and acting excessively out of this excess.
Monday, January 28, 2008
The Wondrous Cross
Over the weekend I read Stephen R. Holmes book The Wondrous Cross.
I think it is a very sensible and clear book. It is brief (much briefer than Pierced for our Transgressions!), and written for a wide audience.
Holmes offers a stout defence of Penal Substitutionary Atonement but does so without overplaying his hand or becoming shrill. He doesn't overstate the scriptural case, for example. One of the things he notes is how the Bible rarely gives us an explanation of how the atonement works. Neither does he overstate the presence of PSA in the tradition: he can only find one clear reference, in Gregory the Great. It is with Calvin that the doctrine comes to full flower.
Furthermore, Holmes does think the doctrine has a contemporary relevance. One of the annoying things (for me) about contemporary missiological works is how the declare with such absoluteness and authority what everyone in contemporary culture does or doesn't think. Holmes seeks a more subtle account, and suggests that PSA may yet have a great deal of resonance with the culture of the West.
One strength of the book for me was that Holmes seeks an account of the atonement which recognises all the different 'stories' of the atonement that we find in Scripture and does not play one off against the other. The tendency for evangelicals who want to defend PSA is to make it the only or the absolutely determinative model of the atonement: something that is certainly hard to justify from Scripture. As Holmes shows, even Calvin would have no truck with this.
There's more to say. These are just a few jottings rather than a review: suffice it to say that I think it is a book that should be more widely read than it is.
I think it is a very sensible and clear book. It is brief (much briefer than Pierced for our Transgressions!), and written for a wide audience.
Holmes offers a stout defence of Penal Substitutionary Atonement but does so without overplaying his hand or becoming shrill. He doesn't overstate the scriptural case, for example. One of the things he notes is how the Bible rarely gives us an explanation of how the atonement works. Neither does he overstate the presence of PSA in the tradition: he can only find one clear reference, in Gregory the Great. It is with Calvin that the doctrine comes to full flower.
Furthermore, Holmes does think the doctrine has a contemporary relevance. One of the annoying things (for me) about contemporary missiological works is how the declare with such absoluteness and authority what everyone in contemporary culture does or doesn't think. Holmes seeks a more subtle account, and suggests that PSA may yet have a great deal of resonance with the culture of the West.
One strength of the book for me was that Holmes seeks an account of the atonement which recognises all the different 'stories' of the atonement that we find in Scripture and does not play one off against the other. The tendency for evangelicals who want to defend PSA is to make it the only or the absolutely determinative model of the atonement: something that is certainly hard to justify from Scripture. As Holmes shows, even Calvin would have no truck with this.
There's more to say. These are just a few jottings rather than a review: suffice it to say that I think it is a book that should be more widely read than it is.
Weaknesses of Anglicanism?
I think one of the great things about the list that Justin generated of the strengths of Anglicanism is that it shows that Anglicanism has the possibility of becoming aware of its own weaknesses. Inbuilt in Anglicanism is the possibility of its own ongoing reformation. It is not beholden in an unrepentant way to its own traditions. This is more difficult for Roman Catholics and for non-conformists, I think, whose identity is more to do with a specific ecclesiology. Yes, that's one of the funny things about Anglicanism: it is (or ought to be) quite pragmatic about ecclesiological matters, in fact (read Richard Hooker to see this) - and what a relief it is too! You know, that is partly why Anglican Evangelicals are even 'lower' church than many Baptists and Presbyterians. Because, if you are a Scriptural Christian, then you can't possibly hold to Anglican church order as the only possibility!
There are some weaknesses worth exploring, however. I think Anglicanism's attachment to an Impirical political vision has yet to be repented of. There is a kind of superiority complex that Anglicans have which is inherited from the English superiority complex. We barely notice it until non-conformists point it out! We are just used to be the church of establishment. Even in Australia, where we are NOT the church of establishment, we act as if we are.
Let's be fair: the British Empire was one of the more benign empires of world history. And Anglican Christianity often ameliorated the rapine capitalism that drove the unprecedented conquest of territory. If you believe in Providence, as I do, then God used even British greed to spreed the gospel to the nations. And the Anglican Communion is perhaps the last vestige of that Empire, apart from the Commonwealth Games. Perhaps you could add to that the dominance of the English language globally, I guess.
Anglicanism, as the church of respectabilty and establishment, has a tendency to elitism and intellectual snobbery. It also licences aestheticism and nominalism. The political liberalism of the contemporary Church of England is not different in style to its former conservatism: it is still very much an establishment politics, a politics of respectability.
Because of the its links to government, too, it has aped the bureacratic structure of liberal government, and has imported its managerialism.
There are some weaknesses worth exploring, however. I think Anglicanism's attachment to an Impirical political vision has yet to be repented of. There is a kind of superiority complex that Anglicans have which is inherited from the English superiority complex. We barely notice it until non-conformists point it out! We are just used to be the church of establishment. Even in Australia, where we are NOT the church of establishment, we act as if we are.
Let's be fair: the British Empire was one of the more benign empires of world history. And Anglican Christianity often ameliorated the rapine capitalism that drove the unprecedented conquest of territory. If you believe in Providence, as I do, then God used even British greed to spreed the gospel to the nations. And the Anglican Communion is perhaps the last vestige of that Empire, apart from the Commonwealth Games. Perhaps you could add to that the dominance of the English language globally, I guess.
Anglicanism, as the church of respectabilty and establishment, has a tendency to elitism and intellectual snobbery. It also licences aestheticism and nominalism. The political liberalism of the contemporary Church of England is not different in style to its former conservatism: it is still very much an establishment politics, a politics of respectability.
Because of the its links to government, too, it has aped the bureacratic structure of liberal government, and has imported its managerialism.
Saturday, January 26, 2008
Some Bloglican stuff
The Ugley Vicar has produced for us a great passage from JC Ryle that is extremely timely. It supplements well Justin's series on the 10 great strengths of Anglicanism.
Maybe it ain't all bad after all!
Maybe it ain't all bad after all!
Wednesday, January 23, 2008
John Donne: The Reformed Soul
Not a review, but a recommendation:
John Stubbs' book John Donne: The Reformed Soul is a biography from the top draw. Thoroughly enjoyable. Stubbs casts Donne as both genuinely a man before God and someone who at the same time changed with the political weather in order to survive and thrive.
Thankyou, Exiled Preacher for recommending it to me!
John Stubbs' book John Donne: The Reformed Soul is a biography from the top draw. Thoroughly enjoyable. Stubbs casts Donne as both genuinely a man before God and someone who at the same time changed with the political weather in order to survive and thrive.
Thankyou, Exiled Preacher for recommending it to me!
Moffatt on way Anglicanism rocks
Justin has a great series going on the 'Ten Elements of Historic Anglicanism'.
It is great, great stuff: drawing from Barnett and Packer.
Give it a read.
Start here and scroll down to see how Anglicanism is Biblical, Protestant, catholic, Reformed and liturgical - and more to come.
On this last post, I commented:
Trouble is, you can't say, oh, I had A great experience of liturgy last Sunday. All you can say is: the hundreds of Sundays accumulated have made a great experience.
Liturgy is like a habit. It is meant to be repeated so that you don't notice what it is doing (partly). Through liturgy, I know several great passages of scripture by heart, because I was exposed to it as a kid. But a single experience? Harder to pin down.
My kids won't have the same benefit, alas, because liturgy has all but disappeared from our culture.
It is great, great stuff: drawing from Barnett and Packer.
Give it a read.
Start here and scroll down to see how Anglicanism is Biblical, Protestant, catholic, Reformed and liturgical - and more to come.
On this last post, I commented:
Trouble is, you can't say, oh, I had A great experience of liturgy last Sunday. All you can say is: the hundreds of Sundays accumulated have made a great experience.
Liturgy is like a habit. It is meant to be repeated so that you don't notice what it is doing (partly). Through liturgy, I know several great passages of scripture by heart, because I was exposed to it as a kid. But a single experience? Harder to pin down.
My kids won't have the same benefit, alas, because liturgy has all but disappeared from our culture.
Friday, January 18, 2008
Williams, on Williams
Rowan Williams gives a nice, almost lucid summary of his own thought:
...the tradition of 'negative theology' in Christian thinking needs to be be understood not just as a corrective but as something of definitive importance in itseld. It is not just that theologians make positive statemenst and then add 'Mind you, this only applies in a rather extended sense, not too literally.' It is rather that both the subject matter and (for lack of a better word) the style of good theology insist upon a radical change of attitude. A doctrine like that of the Trinity tells us that the very life of God is a yielding or giving-over into the life of an Other, a 'negation' in the sense of refusing to settle for the idea that normative life or personal identity is to be conceived in terms of self-enclosed and self-sufficient unities. The negative is associated with the 'ek-static', the discovery of identity in self-transcending relation. And accordingly, theology itself has to speak in a mode that encourages us to question ourselves, to deny oursleves, in the sense of denying sustems and concepts that are the comfortable possession of individual minds. This means both that theological language has to open out on to a sort of darkness - not the darkness of obscurity or confused ignorance, but the darkness of sheer resistance to the finite mind on the part of the divine. And at the same time, theological language must be the language of a community of persons actively engaged in the common life of building the Body of Christ. (Wrestling with Angels p. xiii)
So: apophatic theology is not an addendum: the whole of theology is shot-through with apophaticism.
...the tradition of 'negative theology' in Christian thinking needs to be be understood not just as a corrective but as something of definitive importance in itseld. It is not just that theologians make positive statemenst and then add 'Mind you, this only applies in a rather extended sense, not too literally.' It is rather that both the subject matter and (for lack of a better word) the style of good theology insist upon a radical change of attitude. A doctrine like that of the Trinity tells us that the very life of God is a yielding or giving-over into the life of an Other, a 'negation' in the sense of refusing to settle for the idea that normative life or personal identity is to be conceived in terms of self-enclosed and self-sufficient unities. The negative is associated with the 'ek-static', the discovery of identity in self-transcending relation. And accordingly, theology itself has to speak in a mode that encourages us to question ourselves, to deny oursleves, in the sense of denying sustems and concepts that are the comfortable possession of individual minds. This means both that theological language has to open out on to a sort of darkness - not the darkness of obscurity or confused ignorance, but the darkness of sheer resistance to the finite mind on the part of the divine. And at the same time, theological language must be the language of a community of persons actively engaged in the common life of building the Body of Christ. (Wrestling with Angels p. xiii)
So: apophatic theology is not an addendum: the whole of theology is shot-through with apophaticism.
Thursday, January 17, 2008
How Suicide Bombing Began...
David Brooks, in the Atlantic Monthly of June 2002, conflates martyrdom and suicide bombing in discussing how since the 1980s Islamic terrorists have changed their tactics:
The red passions of the bombers obliterated the grays of the peace process. Suicide bombing became the tactic of choice, even in circumstances where a terrorist could have planted a bomb and then escaped without injury. Martyrdom became not just a means but an end...
...Recruits are sometimes made to lie in empty graves, so that they can see how peaceful death will be; they are reminded that life will bring sickness, old age, and betrayal. "We were in a constant state of worship," one suicide bomber (who somehow managed to survive his mission) told Hassan. "We told each other that if the Israelis only knew how joyful we were they would whip us to death! Those were the happiest days of my life!"...Martyrdom has replaced Palestinian independence as the main focus of the Arab media. Suicide bombing is, after all, perfectly suited to the television age...
...it's time to face the reality that the best resource the terrorists have is the culture of martyrdom. This culture is presently powerful, but it is potentially fragile. If it can be interrupted, if the passions can be made to recede, then the Palestinians and the Israelis might go back to hating each other in the normal way, and at a distance. As with many addictions, the solution is to go cold turkey.
Wednesday, January 16, 2008
Christology and martyrdom
[I will return to the write up of the Providence conference soon, promise!]
Reading Stauffer was interesting. He made the rather obvious point that, if martyrdom is read as an imitation of Christ, then it matters a whole lot what your Christology is in the first place. So, he gives an account of martyrdom which applies his reading of NT Christology.
I think this is true of many contemporary accounts of martyrdom which rest on a rather adoptionist Christology and a subjective view of the atonement. Martyrdom is then primarily an exemplary act, an act of spiritual heroism which is sanctified somewhat after the fact. Or it is a primarily political act whose chief significance lies in its disruption and subversion of power. If you see Jesus chiefly as one who stood up to tyrannical authorities, then martyrdom for you will have this meaning too. And also, it is easier to say that anyone who dies standing up to tyrannical authorities is a martyr after the pattern of Jesus.
A traditional account of the person and work of Christ gives very different results. If for example we take the triplex munus Christi of Calvin, imitating Christ's death becomes more specifically related to the unique and unrepeatable work of Christ. And as such, martyrdom must be read as an extension of Christ's work in the power of the Spirit. It isn't an imitation of it, merely: it actually participates, shares in, the sufferings of Christ himself. The martyr does not become prophet, priest and king: but she shares in the prophetic, priestly and royal work of Christ.
The martyr is a prophet after Christ, because it is an act which speaks. It witnesses to the divine - it is an embodied proclamation of the gospel of Christ. It certainly isn't silent: Stephen's great prophetic speech in Acts 7, for example, continues in the tradition of the OT prophets, and shares their fate of rejection.
The martyr performs a priestly act of sacrifice, offering his or her life up on behalf of others. The early martyrologies have no doubt about the blessing that the martyrs were to the churches; but also, that is was by martyrdom that many came to faith. sanguis semen ecclesiae... This is not some blasphemy in suggesting that Christ's work is repeated, or that Christ is resacrificed in some way. Paul is quite clear in 2 Cor that his sufferings are a rounding out of the sufferings of Christ. The martyrs die for the redemption of the world too: not that their blood pays for sin in the sense that Jesus's does, but in the sense that because of them others come to know Christ.
The martyr is enthroned in death: over and over again we hear of them 'receiving a crown (a stephanos, note!). The martyrs 'overcome'; they 'conquer'. Not because they themselves conquer but becuase, in union with Christ and his death, they share in his victory over the powers.
To complement this schema, I should like to apply the great second-generation Lutheran Martin Chemnitz's christology, too - in his 'humiliation/exaltation' pattern. That's the next step.
Reading Stauffer was interesting. He made the rather obvious point that, if martyrdom is read as an imitation of Christ, then it matters a whole lot what your Christology is in the first place. So, he gives an account of martyrdom which applies his reading of NT Christology.
I think this is true of many contemporary accounts of martyrdom which rest on a rather adoptionist Christology and a subjective view of the atonement. Martyrdom is then primarily an exemplary act, an act of spiritual heroism which is sanctified somewhat after the fact. Or it is a primarily political act whose chief significance lies in its disruption and subversion of power. If you see Jesus chiefly as one who stood up to tyrannical authorities, then martyrdom for you will have this meaning too. And also, it is easier to say that anyone who dies standing up to tyrannical authorities is a martyr after the pattern of Jesus.
A traditional account of the person and work of Christ gives very different results. If for example we take the triplex munus Christi of Calvin, imitating Christ's death becomes more specifically related to the unique and unrepeatable work of Christ. And as such, martyrdom must be read as an extension of Christ's work in the power of the Spirit. It isn't an imitation of it, merely: it actually participates, shares in, the sufferings of Christ himself. The martyr does not become prophet, priest and king: but she shares in the prophetic, priestly and royal work of Christ.
The martyr is a prophet after Christ, because it is an act which speaks. It witnesses to the divine - it is an embodied proclamation of the gospel of Christ. It certainly isn't silent: Stephen's great prophetic speech in Acts 7, for example, continues in the tradition of the OT prophets, and shares their fate of rejection.
The martyr performs a priestly act of sacrifice, offering his or her life up on behalf of others. The early martyrologies have no doubt about the blessing that the martyrs were to the churches; but also, that is was by martyrdom that many came to faith. sanguis semen ecclesiae... This is not some blasphemy in suggesting that Christ's work is repeated, or that Christ is resacrificed in some way. Paul is quite clear in 2 Cor that his sufferings are a rounding out of the sufferings of Christ. The martyrs die for the redemption of the world too: not that their blood pays for sin in the sense that Jesus's does, but in the sense that because of them others come to know Christ.
The martyr is enthroned in death: over and over again we hear of them 'receiving a crown (a stephanos, note!). The martyrs 'overcome'; they 'conquer'. Not because they themselves conquer but becuase, in union with Christ and his death, they share in his victory over the powers.
To complement this schema, I should like to apply the great second-generation Lutheran Martin Chemnitz's christology, too - in his 'humiliation/exaltation' pattern. That's the next step.
'Still Deeper' Conference on Friendship
Still Deeper
‘They speak truly but touch on only half the matter:
We must go deeper.’
Day Conference: Friendship
Still Deeper is a new initiative aimed at encouraging people to go Still Deeper in their engagement with theology and culture. God has provided deep resources for living life – sadly these are often ignored. Many long to make the connections between God and the rest of life, to bring evangelical reflection to bear upon all parts of life. Still Deeper is a forum to do that. Our new web based journal will be online shortly, with commissioned articles engaging with a wide variety of issues and topics. Meanwhile, our first Day Conference is on the topic of ‘Friendship’. Our culture enables us to amass friends on Facebook, but leaves many struggling with loneliness in the real world. As technology makes connection easier, we long for depth in friendship. Christian doctrine has not traditionally had much to say about friendship, but there are deep resources in the Bible and Church History that could breathe fresh life into our friendships. We also hope the conference will be a chance to make new friends!
Dr. Brian Crowe will explore from a Christian perspective our culture’s view of friendship. Brian is a political analyst and is married with two children.
Rev. Melvin Tinker (Vicar of St. John’s, Hull) will bring an exposition from the Bible titled ‘Friendship with Jesus: Preconditions and Pitfalls’. Melvin is a well known author of books on issues of culture and theology.
Peter Sanlon will present a doctrinal session that asks if Christian doctrine has anything distinctive and valuable to say about friendship. Peter is writing a doctoral thesis on Augustine’s preaching, at Cambridge University.
Sam Allberry (Student Minister at St. Ebbes, Oxford) will discuss his experiences of friendship in ministry and the student world.
When: Sat. 23rd Feb. ’08, 10am-4pm
Where: The Round Church, Cambridge, CB2 1UB
Cost: Lunch will be provided for a small charge. The event is free and we welcome voluntary contributions to cover costs.
‘They speak truly but touch on only half the matter:
We must go deeper.’
Day Conference: Friendship
Still Deeper is a new initiative aimed at encouraging people to go Still Deeper in their engagement with theology and culture. God has provided deep resources for living life – sadly these are often ignored. Many long to make the connections between God and the rest of life, to bring evangelical reflection to bear upon all parts of life. Still Deeper is a forum to do that. Our new web based journal will be online shortly, with commissioned articles engaging with a wide variety of issues and topics. Meanwhile, our first Day Conference is on the topic of ‘Friendship’. Our culture enables us to amass friends on Facebook, but leaves many struggling with loneliness in the real world. As technology makes connection easier, we long for depth in friendship. Christian doctrine has not traditionally had much to say about friendship, but there are deep resources in the Bible and Church History that could breathe fresh life into our friendships. We also hope the conference will be a chance to make new friends!
Dr. Brian Crowe will explore from a Christian perspective our culture’s view of friendship. Brian is a political analyst and is married with two children.
Rev. Melvin Tinker (Vicar of St. John’s, Hull) will bring an exposition from the Bible titled ‘Friendship with Jesus: Preconditions and Pitfalls’. Melvin is a well known author of books on issues of culture and theology.
Peter Sanlon will present a doctrinal session that asks if Christian doctrine has anything distinctive and valuable to say about friendship. Peter is writing a doctoral thesis on Augustine’s preaching, at Cambridge University.
Sam Allberry (Student Minister at St. Ebbes, Oxford) will discuss his experiences of friendship in ministry and the student world.
When: Sat. 23rd Feb. ’08, 10am-4pm
Where: The Round Church, Cambridge, CB2 1UB
Cost: Lunch will be provided for a small charge. The event is free and we welcome voluntary contributions to cover costs.
Wannenwetsch on Martyrdom
Political Worship is a book with myriad juicy excurses (as well as a compelling central thesis too).
In responding to Milbank, Wannenwetsch writes:
'Here we are forced to remember that it was actually the Church in the form of its martyrs, who refused to submit to the power of those who were stronger, which gave what was perhaps the most forceful political thrust towards the dissolution of the Roman Empire, as people withdrew from the political worship of the Empire. The effect of the Christian martyrs must, of course, not be interpreted to mean that the principle of non-violence proved superior to Roman violence. Their impact was not based on any ontological ascendancy of non-violence over violence. It was due to the fact that the refusal to go along with the worship of the gods of war, who represented the imperial claim to rule, pointed to the question about the authorization or empowerment for such action. If Christians found this empowerment in their worship, that worship did not merely reflect the impossibility of joining in the worship of Roman tyranny; it also showed the possibility of seeing this risky refusal through. Even today, the decisive constructive question of political ethics is the question about the formation of power.' (p. 114)
'If the Christians had viewed their worship as a private domestic cult, they could easily have enjoyed the religious tolerance betsowed by the Roman authorities in this respect, and would have been spared the experience of martyrdom. As it was, martyrdom was inevitable, since the ekklesia was bound from the beginning to celebrate 'political worship'. It could not worship the Lord of the cosmos as the penates were worshipped' it had to do so in a way which its pagan environment could not avoid viewing as an insult to the gods of the state, and was bound to suffer the sanctions imposed upon an 'atheism' hostile to this state...' (p. 148)
In responding to Milbank, Wannenwetsch writes:
'Here we are forced to remember that it was actually the Church in the form of its martyrs, who refused to submit to the power of those who were stronger, which gave what was perhaps the most forceful political thrust towards the dissolution of the Roman Empire, as people withdrew from the political worship of the Empire. The effect of the Christian martyrs must, of course, not be interpreted to mean that the principle of non-violence proved superior to Roman violence. Their impact was not based on any ontological ascendancy of non-violence over violence. It was due to the fact that the refusal to go along with the worship of the gods of war, who represented the imperial claim to rule, pointed to the question about the authorization or empowerment for such action. If Christians found this empowerment in their worship, that worship did not merely reflect the impossibility of joining in the worship of Roman tyranny; it also showed the possibility of seeing this risky refusal through. Even today, the decisive constructive question of political ethics is the question about the formation of power.' (p. 114)
'If the Christians had viewed their worship as a private domestic cult, they could easily have enjoyed the religious tolerance betsowed by the Roman authorities in this respect, and would have been spared the experience of martyrdom. As it was, martyrdom was inevitable, since the ekklesia was bound from the beginning to celebrate 'political worship'. It could not worship the Lord of the cosmos as the penates were worshipped' it had to do so in a way which its pagan environment could not avoid viewing as an insult to the gods of the state, and was bound to suffer the sanctions imposed upon an 'atheism' hostile to this state...' (p. 148)
Tuesday, January 15, 2008
Ethelbert Stauffer on 'The Martyr Church'
One of the few New Testament Theologies to pay direct attention to the concept of martyrdom is that of Ethelbert Stauffer, published in the 50s (at least, the English edition).
'We have already remarked how the life of Christ constitutes a prototype for the life of the believer. Nowhere is this pototype more concretely and seriously expressed than in the correlation between th epassion of Christ and the sufferings of the martyr Church.' p. 185
'The man who confesses Christ is taken up into the fellowship of Christ's sufferings; indeed his destiny is conformed to the death of Christ.' p. 185
Stauffer argues that the passion of Christ was envisaged under three themes: doxological, antagonistic and soteriological, and that the imitation of his passion must follow the same pattern.
Thus, martyrdom doxologically undergoes great suffering on the path to glory. Via crucis - via lucis ! What the world rejects, God honours and accepts and even glorifies.
Of course, this rests on the antagonism of the world: 'the doxological interpretation of martyrdom finally comes to expression in an antagonistic conception: the tempter, the accuser, the opponent, the violent enemy and slanderer and evil one, the opponent of the generation of the righteous, puts everything in the wolrd to action so as to effect the downfall of the saints of God, or to destroy them... (p. 186). Hence, the imagery of a battle or a struggle become more and more the stock in trade of the martyrologist - 'It is but a little thing for the Satanic powers of the world to get rid of God's witnesses. But the Christian who has confessed CHrist in his death stands for a power in history that cannot be got rid of, a reality not of this world that the persecutor can never master.'(p. 187)
The soteriological understanding of martyrdom links for Stauffer to the indea of the final massacre of the saints...'The witness who gives his life helps by his death to complete the toll of suffering that God has descreed for the world as punishment and expiation for its sin, so that the divine wrath should be truned and at long last the day of grace should dawn.' (p. 188) Martyrs in this way actually bear the afflictions of Christ in the service of his Church. The bear upon themselves the punishment of the world (after a fashion). Not in quite the decisive way that Christ does of course, but in imitation and conformity to him. After all:
'it is not just the Church of Christ that will benefit from the atoning power of the apostle's sufferings - the confessor suffers for mankind that despises him, the martyr dies for the cosmos that rejects him...the death of the martyrs is a plea for the ending of affliction, culminating as an intercession for the sins of many. (p. 188)
'We have already remarked how the life of Christ constitutes a prototype for the life of the believer. Nowhere is this pototype more concretely and seriously expressed than in the correlation between th epassion of Christ and the sufferings of the martyr Church.' p. 185
'The man who confesses Christ is taken up into the fellowship of Christ's sufferings; indeed his destiny is conformed to the death of Christ.' p. 185
Stauffer argues that the passion of Christ was envisaged under three themes: doxological, antagonistic and soteriological, and that the imitation of his passion must follow the same pattern.
Thus, martyrdom doxologically undergoes great suffering on the path to glory. Via crucis - via lucis ! What the world rejects, God honours and accepts and even glorifies.
Of course, this rests on the antagonism of the world: 'the doxological interpretation of martyrdom finally comes to expression in an antagonistic conception: the tempter, the accuser, the opponent, the violent enemy and slanderer and evil one, the opponent of the generation of the righteous, puts everything in the wolrd to action so as to effect the downfall of the saints of God, or to destroy them... (p. 186). Hence, the imagery of a battle or a struggle become more and more the stock in trade of the martyrologist - 'It is but a little thing for the Satanic powers of the world to get rid of God's witnesses. But the Christian who has confessed CHrist in his death stands for a power in history that cannot be got rid of, a reality not of this world that the persecutor can never master.'(p. 187)
The soteriological understanding of martyrdom links for Stauffer to the indea of the final massacre of the saints...'The witness who gives his life helps by his death to complete the toll of suffering that God has descreed for the world as punishment and expiation for its sin, so that the divine wrath should be truned and at long last the day of grace should dawn.' (p. 188) Martyrs in this way actually bear the afflictions of Christ in the service of his Church. The bear upon themselves the punishment of the world (after a fashion). Not in quite the decisive way that Christ does of course, but in imitation and conformity to him. After all:
'it is not just the Church of Christ that will benefit from the atoning power of the apostle's sufferings - the confessor suffers for mankind that despises him, the martyr dies for the cosmos that rejects him...the death of the martyrs is a plea for the ending of affliction, culminating as an intercession for the sins of many. (p. 188)
Sunday, January 13, 2008
‘Deus Habet Consilium’ - The Providence Conference, Day 1 - III
Alister McGrath - The Secularization of Providence
Though I have read many of his excellent books, I had never up to this point heard Alister McGrath give a lecture. I have to say this was a virtuouso performance in terms of sheer communicative ability and clarity of thought. McGrath is a master lecturer - on top of his material, clear, concise, interesting, on top of power point technology and so on. Very impressive.
His material was very interesting too, and set in train one of the themes of the conference which was the relation between scientific theories of causality (namely, evolution) and theological thought about the same (namely, providence). McGrath began with three issues: Darwinism as a view of reality that leaves no space for Providence; the elimination of the transcendent; and the elimination of Providence as a doctrine. What he was trying to indicate was that we could in fact have Darwinism and Providence, despite what Dawkins and other agrressive atheists say. McGrath was at pains to point out that Dawkins has smuggled in metaphysical claims, stretching Darwinism beyond its brief.
Darwinism has in the hands of Dawkins and co become a worldview - indeed, a totalizing vision of reality. It now operates as the explanatory principle par exellence. But at this point it becomes quite vulnerable. Because it must admit its own provisionality ... A further unresolved tension in Dawkinsism is that between 'rationality' and 'chance'.
(my notes unfortunately peter out somewhat after this point... suffice it to say, McGrath is optimistic about the potential for natural theology. He is giving the Gifford lectures soon, so it should be interesting to see where he goes with this.)
Though I have read many of his excellent books, I had never up to this point heard Alister McGrath give a lecture. I have to say this was a virtuouso performance in terms of sheer communicative ability and clarity of thought. McGrath is a master lecturer - on top of his material, clear, concise, interesting, on top of power point technology and so on. Very impressive.
His material was very interesting too, and set in train one of the themes of the conference which was the relation between scientific theories of causality (namely, evolution) and theological thought about the same (namely, providence). McGrath began with three issues: Darwinism as a view of reality that leaves no space for Providence; the elimination of the transcendent; and the elimination of Providence as a doctrine. What he was trying to indicate was that we could in fact have Darwinism and Providence, despite what Dawkins and other agrressive atheists say. McGrath was at pains to point out that Dawkins has smuggled in metaphysical claims, stretching Darwinism beyond its brief.
Darwinism has in the hands of Dawkins and co become a worldview - indeed, a totalizing vision of reality. It now operates as the explanatory principle par exellence. But at this point it becomes quite vulnerable. Because it must admit its own provisionality ... A further unresolved tension in Dawkinsism is that between 'rationality' and 'chance'.
(my notes unfortunately peter out somewhat after this point... suffice it to say, McGrath is optimistic about the potential for natural theology. He is giving the Gifford lectures soon, so it should be interesting to see where he goes with this.)
Saturday, January 12, 2008
‘Deus Habet Consilium’ - The Providence Conference, Day 1 - II
The second paper was delivered by Prof. Andrew McGowan from Highland Theological College: ‘Providence and Common Grace—A Reformed Perspective’.
McGowan's paper suggested that the Dutch Neo-Calvinist explanation of 'common grace' offers the most promising way forward for Reformed dogmatics. Especially, he commended to us the work of Herman Bavinck. Talking to Prof McGowan later, he told me that Bavinck had been a fairly late discovery for him. The recent translation of his works by John Bolt and others has been not before time.
McGowan began by noting how Calvin's doctrine of common grace gave a very positive account of the human arts and sciences even among the reprobate. That is, God's providence serves to ameliorate the effects of the fall to such a degree that it is possible to see his blessing in human civilisation outside the church. For Calvin, nothing takes place without God's deliberation: he is intimately involved in every aspect of the created order. Calvin was of course prepared to attribute both good and bad harvests to God - he was not prepared to countenance any dualism (this was something contested by others at the conference, notably David Bentley Hart). Calvin does have a doctrine of secondary causation of course: and will not allow the Sovereignty of God to absolve us from blame. But the doctrine is a great encouragement to believers. Though our natural and spiritual gifts are somewhat damaged, we do retain a certain aptitude in the arts and sciences. No splitting of nature and grace for Calvin! Everything good we do is the result of grace. Grace is why human beings are not as bad as they could be.
In post-Reformation theology this identification of nature with grace was continued. But the theme of common grace is not picked up or emphasised in the 17th century documents and confessions, McGowan noted.
It wasn't until ABraham Kuyper that common grace was given its due attention as a doctrine. Kuyper developed the theme on a grand scale, but also he pushed the antithesis between the Christian and the non-Christian. He developed the idea of Christianity as an entire worldview (following the Scot James Orr in this). He also developed his doctrine of sphere sovereignty.
Bavinck's exposition of common grace is, for McGowan, a superior model. He rejected natural theology while maintaining general revelation. Common grace (not nature) is the basis for special grace. Nature and grace are not set in opposition, but rather grace purifies and restores nature. This is a key to Bavinck's theology! There is 'an organic relationship between nature and grace'. This is also a key to his very interesting doctrine of Scripture (which differs from Warfield's rather problematic one).
The fall damaged but did not eradicate the imago dei. But common grace is not enough to restore us. It compels us, but does not change us. Christ does not create an entirely new order, then, but transforms what is. Bavinck roots common grace in the incarnation...
So, where according to his doc of common grace Kuyper advocated the development of Christian institutions - a Christian university, a Christian newspaper, a Christian political party, Christian schooling and so on - Bavinck, who was much closer to Calvin and much more moderate in this, held that the antithesis was of principles and not of people. Common grace properly understood means that we don't have to listen to Christian music: we can observe the operation of common grace in human music making in general.
McGowan left me wanting to purchase the remaining volumes of Bavinck's dogmatics! I wonder too, if one rejoinder to 'creation' 'science' is that it lacks a proper doctrine of common grace in its outright suspicion of non-Christian scientists. It couples paranoia with all its other problems.
McGowan's paper suggested that the Dutch Neo-Calvinist explanation of 'common grace' offers the most promising way forward for Reformed dogmatics. Especially, he commended to us the work of Herman Bavinck. Talking to Prof McGowan later, he told me that Bavinck had been a fairly late discovery for him. The recent translation of his works by John Bolt and others has been not before time.
McGowan began by noting how Calvin's doctrine of common grace gave a very positive account of the human arts and sciences even among the reprobate. That is, God's providence serves to ameliorate the effects of the fall to such a degree that it is possible to see his blessing in human civilisation outside the church. For Calvin, nothing takes place without God's deliberation: he is intimately involved in every aspect of the created order. Calvin was of course prepared to attribute both good and bad harvests to God - he was not prepared to countenance any dualism (this was something contested by others at the conference, notably David Bentley Hart). Calvin does have a doctrine of secondary causation of course: and will not allow the Sovereignty of God to absolve us from blame. But the doctrine is a great encouragement to believers. Though our natural and spiritual gifts are somewhat damaged, we do retain a certain aptitude in the arts and sciences. No splitting of nature and grace for Calvin! Everything good we do is the result of grace. Grace is why human beings are not as bad as they could be.
In post-Reformation theology this identification of nature with grace was continued. But the theme of common grace is not picked up or emphasised in the 17th century documents and confessions, McGowan noted.
It wasn't until ABraham Kuyper that common grace was given its due attention as a doctrine. Kuyper developed the theme on a grand scale, but also he pushed the antithesis between the Christian and the non-Christian. He developed the idea of Christianity as an entire worldview (following the Scot James Orr in this). He also developed his doctrine of sphere sovereignty.
Bavinck's exposition of common grace is, for McGowan, a superior model. He rejected natural theology while maintaining general revelation. Common grace (not nature) is the basis for special grace. Nature and grace are not set in opposition, but rather grace purifies and restores nature. This is a key to Bavinck's theology! There is 'an organic relationship between nature and grace'. This is also a key to his very interesting doctrine of Scripture (which differs from Warfield's rather problematic one).
The fall damaged but did not eradicate the imago dei. But common grace is not enough to restore us. It compels us, but does not change us. Christ does not create an entirely new order, then, but transforms what is. Bavinck roots common grace in the incarnation...
So, where according to his doc of common grace Kuyper advocated the development of Christian institutions - a Christian university, a Christian newspaper, a Christian political party, Christian schooling and so on - Bavinck, who was much closer to Calvin and much more moderate in this, held that the antithesis was of principles and not of people. Common grace properly understood means that we don't have to listen to Christian music: we can observe the operation of common grace in human music making in general.
McGowan left me wanting to purchase the remaining volumes of Bavinck's dogmatics! I wonder too, if one rejoinder to 'creation' 'science' is that it lacks a proper doctrine of common grace in its outright suspicion of non-Christian scientists. It couples paranoia with all its other problems.
‘Deus Habet Consilium’ - The Providence Conference, Day 1 - I
Day one at the Providence conference was 'Protestant dogmatics' day (by and large.) We were given the most curiously diffident welcome by an obviously disinterested University bureaucrat, which contrasted with the air of expectation amongst the conference attendees!
1. Owing to a late arriving plane, Professor John Webster of Aberdeen opened the conference in the place of Katherine Sonderegger with a paper entitled 'On the Theology of Providence'. It was an inspiring beginning, though not designed for note taking I am afraid! Webster gave a characteristically dense thesis statement which he then proceeded to unpack (I wish I could have recorded what it was!). Providence is a contrary doctrine, because it contrasts with our experience of the world. That is what makes its task urgent. Providence is a 'distributed doctrine': in formal terms, its dogmatic location lies both within theology and economy. It must of course preserve its Christian specificity. Most properly, Providence is a description of salvation history. We grasp the knowledge of Providence by faith that is the result of mortification and vivification. And what we have revealed to us is that there is lament, but not tragedy - we realise that God is for us (by the cross). Knowledge of Providence thus becomes practical knowledge - faithful reason's receiving of consolation.
God orders his world out of his divine life and blessedness: he bestows life on the creature, and then sustains it, for he cannot merely 'make'. He gives being for a historical nature. Providence is an expression of the love of God which helps the creature to flourish. It is not only an aspect of cosmology; it is a teaching about the creature's dependence in an ongoing way on the creator. Creation bestows being... which then has its own independence...but needs help to persist. The church is the interim relocation of the goal of the creature.
Of course, the big problems for any doctrine of providence are the creature's freedom, and the problem of evil. How is Providence for the creature's good? Webster asserted that God's governance actually secures the creature's freedom - proper creaturely freedom that is. Freedom is not WON From God, but rather given by him and receieved by creatures. God moves us with an inner movement. As Turretin said, it is the fount of all error to equate liberty with spontaneity. Caused causes are still properly (though secondarily) causes.
Providence is a gospel consolation. But we must reach that comfort at the right pace. Belief in the doctrine of providence is something learned...
1. Owing to a late arriving plane, Professor John Webster of Aberdeen opened the conference in the place of Katherine Sonderegger with a paper entitled 'On the Theology of Providence'. It was an inspiring beginning, though not designed for note taking I am afraid! Webster gave a characteristically dense thesis statement which he then proceeded to unpack (I wish I could have recorded what it was!). Providence is a contrary doctrine, because it contrasts with our experience of the world. That is what makes its task urgent. Providence is a 'distributed doctrine': in formal terms, its dogmatic location lies both within theology and economy. It must of course preserve its Christian specificity. Most properly, Providence is a description of salvation history. We grasp the knowledge of Providence by faith that is the result of mortification and vivification. And what we have revealed to us is that there is lament, but not tragedy - we realise that God is for us (by the cross). Knowledge of Providence thus becomes practical knowledge - faithful reason's receiving of consolation.
God orders his world out of his divine life and blessedness: he bestows life on the creature, and then sustains it, for he cannot merely 'make'. He gives being for a historical nature. Providence is an expression of the love of God which helps the creature to flourish. It is not only an aspect of cosmology; it is a teaching about the creature's dependence in an ongoing way on the creator. Creation bestows being... which then has its own independence...but needs help to persist. The church is the interim relocation of the goal of the creature.
Of course, the big problems for any doctrine of providence are the creature's freedom, and the problem of evil. How is Providence for the creature's good? Webster asserted that God's governance actually secures the creature's freedom - proper creaturely freedom that is. Freedom is not WON From God, but rather given by him and receieved by creatures. God moves us with an inner movement. As Turretin said, it is the fount of all error to equate liberty with spontaneity. Caused causes are still properly (though secondarily) causes.
Providence is a gospel consolation. But we must reach that comfort at the right pace. Belief in the doctrine of providence is something learned...
Friday, January 11, 2008
Yoder on suffering
Yoder says:
...the true missionary congregation is marked by suffering. This suffering, like that of the faithful servant in 1 Peter, is not the result of misbehaviour but of conformity with the path of Christ. It is not the resigned acceptance of limitations or injustice in an imperfect world but the meaningful assuming of the cost of nonconformed obedience.
It is no accident that the word 'martyr' has the double meaning of testimony and innocent suffering. The suffering of the church is not a passing tight spot after which there can be hope of return to normalcy; it is according to both Scripture and experience the continuing destiny of any faithful Christian community... (From The Royal Priesthood p. 86).
Is it the continuing destiny? Is that true of experience, really? If suffering is here persecution, then surely that is not the case experientially. The suffering of the faithful servant in 1 Peter is not the sign of his faithfulness: it is, rather, the very real possibility that he courts. But his duty is not suffering but faithfulness. His faithfulness is the sign rather than his suffering. There is no hope of a return to normalcy, true: but neither is it quite true to say that it is the 'continuing destiny' of any faithful Christian community, as if the lack of suffering was a sign that the plot had been well and truly lost. Suffering itself conveys no dignity of its own.
...the true missionary congregation is marked by suffering. This suffering, like that of the faithful servant in 1 Peter, is not the result of misbehaviour but of conformity with the path of Christ. It is not the resigned acceptance of limitations or injustice in an imperfect world but the meaningful assuming of the cost of nonconformed obedience.
It is no accident that the word 'martyr' has the double meaning of testimony and innocent suffering. The suffering of the church is not a passing tight spot after which there can be hope of return to normalcy; it is according to both Scripture and experience the continuing destiny of any faithful Christian community... (From The Royal Priesthood p. 86).
Is it the continuing destiny? Is that true of experience, really? If suffering is here persecution, then surely that is not the case experientially. The suffering of the faithful servant in 1 Peter is not the sign of his faithfulness: it is, rather, the very real possibility that he courts. But his duty is not suffering but faithfulness. His faithfulness is the sign rather than his suffering. There is no hope of a return to normalcy, true: but neither is it quite true to say that it is the 'continuing destiny' of any faithful Christian community, as if the lack of suffering was a sign that the plot had been well and truly lost. Suffering itself conveys no dignity of its own.
Thursday, January 10, 2008
Report from Aberdeen
Kosta Milkov and I headed oop north on Monday for the Providence Conference. And what a feast it turned out to be: 18 top-draw speakers crammed into 3 days. I have to say that the standard of the papers was uniformly high. The organisers should be congratulated for identifying an issue that is evidently on the boil - and attracting an impressive range and calibre of speakers. The one drawback of such a packed programme was that each speaker was allowed a cold hour, which almost all speakers used completely, and so there was very little time for questions and interaction.Time now for some general comments and observed themes - more specific ones to follow. I was interested that Calvin was a prominent and properly celebrated and respected reference point, at least for the Protestant speakers. David Bentley Hart of course made a very significant attack on Calvin's doctrine of providence from an Orthodox perspective, but that Calvin was a reference point at all was, to me, a very significant in modern theology. Aquinas was of course prominent in the more Catholic papers. A key issue it seems to me is what Charles Taylor calls 'the disenchantment': that shift in metaphysics that occured at the time of the reformation which can be seen as the harbinger of the modern scientific and mechanistic world view. By reducing Providence to causation, (the argument runs), the presence of God has been chased out of the world itself. Further, by proclaiming God as Supreme rather than as properly Transcendent, the mistake has been intensified in all Western theology since. Deism and then atheism are inevitable.
Sarah Coakley suggested that a new model of evolution as co-operation might actually complement theology and so end the war between them. This was an interesting countepart to Alister McGrath's paper (what an excellent speaker he is) responding to Dawkins attack on providence. Kathryn Sonderegger proposed that, counter to most traditional accounts, death itself prior to the fall was 'natural', and even a sacrifice the creation offered to its maker. We ought to seperate first and second death, especially in our readings of Romans 5 and so on.
Another strong theme in the conference was the consideration of the use of providence in Public theology. Notwithstanding an inevitable Americo-centricism here, there were three excellent papers on political theology. Oliver O'Donovan's influence was palpable, which makes me very happy: and we had proper and convincing accounts of political engagement and just war (Hauerwasianism is getting rather monolithic and tiresome!). I was especially intrigued by Philip Zeigler's use of the English Civil War and Oliver Cromwell (much maligned of course) in this. Trust in God, and keep your powder dry!!
Of course, the pastoral implications of Providence were never far away, and we had two excellent contributions on this theme. Providence is in a very real sense the ground and comfort of the Christian life.
Anyhow, these are just some first broad brush strokes. More to come!
Monday, January 07, 2008
Off to Aberdeen
Canterbury Cathedral. So far we have visited Worcester, Gloucester, Oxford, Coventry, St Albans, St Paul's London, York, Salisbury and Canterbury.
Tomorrow I fly up to Aberdeen to attend ‘Deus Habet Consilium’ An International Conference on the Career & Prospects of Providence in Modern Theology.
See the conference programme here. I am especially looking forward to Alister McGrath, John Webster, Andrew MacGowan and David Bentley Hart.
My dream is to blog as I go, but I am not sure what internet facilities will be available. So perhaps a full report on Thursday.
Saturday, January 05, 2008
Foucault, as often, gets it...
Nice stuff from Michel Foucault. By exomologesis he means the acts of penance by which you show yourself penitent...
Foucault / HERMENEUTICS OF THE SELF
To justify this exomologesis and this renunciation to oneself in manifesting the truth about oneself, Christian fathers had recourse to several models. The well-known medical model was very often used in pagan philosophy: one has to show his wounds to the physicians if he wants to be healed. They also used the judicial model: one always appeases the court when spontaneously confessing the faults. But the most important model to justify the necessity of exomologesis is the model of martyrdom. The martyr is he who prefers to face death rather than to abandon his faith. The sinner abandons the faith in order to keep the life of here below; he will be reinstated only if in his turn he exposes himself voluntarily to a sort of martyrdom to which all will be witnesses, and which is penance, or penance as exolmologesis. Such a demonstration does not therefore have as its function the establishment of the personal identity. Rather, such a demonstration serves to mark this dramatic demonstration of what one is: the refusal of the self, the breaking off from one's self. One recalls what was the objective of Stoic technology: it was to superimpose, as I tried to explain to you last week, the subject of knowledge and the subject of will by means of the perpetual rememorizing of the rules. The formula which is at the heart of exomologesis is, in contrary, ego non sum ego. The exomologesis seeks, in opposition to the Stoic techniques, to superimpose by an act of violent rupture the truth about oneself and the renunciation of oneself. In the ostentatious gestures of maceration, self-revelation in exomologesis is, at the same time, self-destruction.
Thursday, January 03, 2008
Justin's MO on preaching
My old old mate Justin Moffatt has a really interesting description of his sermon preparation method here. The results he comes up with are pretty good I think, so I am interested to see how he does it.
Tuesday, January 01, 2008
More on Williams and Wiles...
Has Williams succeeded in outflanking Wiles? Has he, in other words, managed to burrow into the world of the text such that krisis – that moment of decision when we are confronted, yea even judged by what we meet in the text – is allowed its prominence? Williams attempts to see from within: but has he smuggled in an objectivism – the kind of objectivism he repudiates – somewhere along the line? Tendenzkritik, that form of criticism most interested in uncovering in the text the interests of various individuals and communities, per definition tends to be hypersuspicious of ‘interests’. It holds as its moral starting point the critique of power itself. Is it not the case, however, that Williams’ version of krisis – his teaching on the judgement of Christ – resembles the values of Tendenzkritik?
That is to say: Williams seems to operate with a definite set of moral presuppositions. For example, he is tentative in his claims about language because of the tendency of individuals and groups to use language – and perhaps religious language more than any other kind – for their own interests. This is what the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth exposes to us, on his account. Williams would argue that Kritik is the right kind of intellectual work prompted by and encounter with Jesus: it takes his judgement and applies it self-critically to the practice of Christian speaking and thinking about God. Yet is it not surely the case that this reading of Jesus, and this application of Jesus’ teaching, is itself generated by the application of critical methods to the New Testament? It goes without saying that the history of New Testament scholarship is dominated by the triumphant revelation by each generation of the prejudices and preferences of the previous one.[1]
My charge is that Williams’ exposition of krisis is a product itself of Kritik, rather than the other way around. The problem is, once Tendenzkritik is in the tank, it tends to devour all the other fish. Where does Kritik end and krisis begin? Can we so readily shift from one to the other? Is this a moral possibility to have a text which is so beset with interest-laden and inadequate human talk as authoritative Scripture, as the catholic church has always held it to be? It is difficult to see how, on Williams account, we can read the New Testament with any confidence that we are able to apply the right filtration to the text and so be judged by it in exactly the right way. Can we really be both radically suspicious and humbly naïve about the text at one and the same time?
[1] See Stephen Neill and N. T. Wright, The Interpretation of the New Testament, 1861-1986, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
That is to say: Williams seems to operate with a definite set of moral presuppositions. For example, he is tentative in his claims about language because of the tendency of individuals and groups to use language – and perhaps religious language more than any other kind – for their own interests. This is what the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth exposes to us, on his account. Williams would argue that Kritik is the right kind of intellectual work prompted by and encounter with Jesus: it takes his judgement and applies it self-critically to the practice of Christian speaking and thinking about God. Yet is it not surely the case that this reading of Jesus, and this application of Jesus’ teaching, is itself generated by the application of critical methods to the New Testament? It goes without saying that the history of New Testament scholarship is dominated by the triumphant revelation by each generation of the prejudices and preferences of the previous one.[1]
My charge is that Williams’ exposition of krisis is a product itself of Kritik, rather than the other way around. The problem is, once Tendenzkritik is in the tank, it tends to devour all the other fish. Where does Kritik end and krisis begin? Can we so readily shift from one to the other? Is this a moral possibility to have a text which is so beset with interest-laden and inadequate human talk as authoritative Scripture, as the catholic church has always held it to be? It is difficult to see how, on Williams account, we can read the New Testament with any confidence that we are able to apply the right filtration to the text and so be judged by it in exactly the right way. Can we really be both radically suspicious and humbly naïve about the text at one and the same time?
[1] See Stephen Neill and N. T. Wright, The Interpretation of the New Testament, 1861-1986, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
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