Saturday, May 07, 2011

From Sydney to Skopje 5



On Wednesday night, the Balkan Institute for Faith and Culture held an event at a centrally located venue in Skopje at which I spoke on 'Martyrdom and Identity'. Professor Ljubomir Cuculovski of the Philosophy department at the University very kindly agreed to be a respondent to my paper. We then had a very interesting and pleasant discussion with those present, in which Macedonian Orthodox, Protestant, and more secular views were aired and respectfully engaged with. There were upwards of 50 people there). This event has been perhaps most representative of what the BIFC is about.



On Thursday, I had an interview with a journalist from the Macedonian government television station. It is the middle of an election campaign here, so that she was able to slot us in was an answer to prayer. I was able to speak about Christian martyrdom and to underline the importance of the person and work of Christ. The programme will appear soon.



I then went to preach at the Thursday evening church service at the Evangelical Church. I preached on Jesus's work to defeat the works of the devil, from 1 John 3:8.

Today, Friday, Kosta and I were interviewed by a young documentary film maker who is trying to produce a film on the importance of love for religious traditions. Her first question? 'What is the basis for your belief?' We had a really interesting discussion on whether love is God (as opposed to God being love).




I then held a seminar on 'Research Methods' for the BIFC. This was an open invitation once more. This time the venue was the BIFC's offices in Skopje. Seven people attended, from Orthodox, Protestant and other backgrounds. We were able to talk about the importance of scholarly research actually serving others and not being just an end in itself.



It's off to Strumica in the east of Macedonia this weekend for more lectures, seminars and sermons!

Thursday, May 05, 2011

From Sydney to Skopje 4

After preaching twice on Sunday, Monday was a public holiday - which has afforded me some time to look around and take in the lovely scenery which surrounds Skopje.

But it was back to work on Tuesday. First, I had the opportunity to address a public meeting at the University of SS Cyril and Methodius on the topic 'The Gospel according to Mark Zuckerberg? Mastering the New Social Media'.
This event was co-hosted by the department of Political Science and the Balkan Institute for Faith and Culture. It was well-attended and the discussion was vigorous and interesting!

From there I went to a meeting of the student group Egzodus and spoke on 'The word of God is not in chains'.

Saturday, April 30, 2011

From Sydney to Skopje 3 - Theological Anthropology

I am here in Macedonia as a guest of the newly founded Balkan Institute for Faith and Culture, which is run by my good friends Kosta and Nada Milkov:




One of the things that the BFIC would like to promote is a series of lectures/seminars for pastors called 'Theology for Life'. Yesterday I began teaching a group of around twenty evangelical pastors and pastor's wives from all over the country and from Bulgaria as well my 'Theological Anthropology' material. There were Baptists, Congregationalists, independents, and others too. The material was designed for Moore College's MA course/4th year programme - that is, for theology graduates who are in pastoral ministry or about to enter it, but with a degree of assumed knowledge. The group of pastors and their wives certainly all fit this profile, and participated knowledgeably and insightfully. I am completing the course today (Saturday) by teaching from 9am to 6pm. I believe we will be stopping for lunch!





Here is Kosta at the church building where the seminar is being held.





This is the Evangelical Church of Macedonia in Skopje.





This is the seminar about to get down to work.



And here we are four hours later having finished for the evening. It was a very enjoyable time with a lot of stimulating discussion and plenty of laughs!





Friday, April 29, 2011

From Sydney to Skopje 2

So I have mostly recovered from my jetlag, and I don't look so much like this anymore:








I have been resting up good at Kosta, Nada and Gabriella's flat in Skopje:




They have real mountains here - and you can almost see them in my poor photograph:






Then on Thursday afternoon I went to my first speaking event at the Evangelical Church in Skopje. I was speaking on 'The Christian Life - Faith, Prayer, Obedience:








30 or more people turned up from 4pm, and then at 6pm my last talk was part of a service that including singing and prayer. We sang 'Blessed be the Name' and 'Lord I lift your name on high'. As it turned out, we were also visited by a mission team from a bible college in Tirana, Albania who in turn brought with them some Italians. So I had my talk translated into Macedonian, Albanian and Italian. It was a lively meeting!






We then went out for some food:



Tomorrow I am teaching Theological Anthroplogy to a group of pastors and others. Ciao!

Wednesday, April 20, 2011

Andrew Cameron's Joined-Up Life

My colleague and friend Andrew Cameron has just published his book Joined-Up Life. It's an account of what we usually call 'ethics'.

Anyone who knows Andrew will know that he is one of the most perceptive and interesting Christian thinkers around. I am about 100 pages in and I can say already that the book marries pith and profoundity - no mean feat.

Monday, April 18, 2011

Euthanasia as corrosive of care relationships

I was once privileged, when I was a School Chaplain several years ago, to lead an hour-long discussion with a class of sixteen year olds on the question of suicide.
As Chaplain, I was privy to information that many in the class were not: that there were at any given time as many as ten students in the school for whom there was grave concern about the possibility that they might attempt self-harm.

The question I put to the students was this: what would you do if a friend of yours told you that they had decided to kill themselves?

The answer was chilling – more chilling than they realised. As one they insisted that, although this was a sad circumstance, you ought not intervene and tell someone else they couldn’t do it, if that was their decision. You could certainly not say to the person that they were doing the wrong thing.

For the students, the autonomous decision of the individual was absolutely sacrosanct, even to this terrible point.

This story is not about euthanasia, exactly, but it is about the kind of moral language we are equipped with and with which we are equipping young people. And it demonstrates the prison into which we have locked ourselves with the language of free choice. The priority of the individual’s right to choose renders us inarticulate just where we most need to say something. It coarsens our moral language. It makes us unable to say to someone else: ‘You can rely on me to stay with you and preserve your life as far as I can even when you feel like doing harm to yourself.’

It is the language of moral autonomy that propels the push for voluntary euthanasia, and renders us speechless to oppose it. For if my individual freedom to choose is the trump card in all moral questions, then the best thing that the law can do is to facilitate that choice. In this instance, that means legislating so as to enable the medical profession to assist in the suicide of terminally ill patients in their care should the patient seek to be so assisted. If individual choice is ultimate, then it seems to me there is no argument.

But I would argue that, as a theological perspective shows us, individual choice is not ultimate. It is part of a whole suite of moral factors that have bearing on these very complex and difficult circumstances. The choice to end one’s own life is, in most circumstances, an immoral choice that the law should protect us from making; and in which the law should protect others from complicity.

Why is this?
Because we are, as the Christian story tells us and plain observation confirms, not essentially agents of individual choice, but creatures made for community. We are made for love and trust more than we are made for freedom. And it is to love sustained by trust that we owe our moral decision-making, and not to freedom. It is not permission that we need, but a knowledge of what our licence to act in a certain way might cost others.

We should remember that for Christians, life itself is not an absolute good, nor even the highest of goods. Christians carry before them an astonishing symbol - the cross of Jesus Christ. At the very centre of the Christian gospel is an act of voluntary self-sacrifice to suffering and death. This is what Christians call ‘the good news’. That free laying down of one’s life becomes in the New Testament the very source of life for those who follow Christ. And it becomes the model for their lives in turn. The Christian is called to a cross-shaped existence as an echo of and a testimony to that relinquishing of a life that others may live. Christians are those who are ready to die for what they believe – and have done so in their droves down the centuries.

What does this teach us? That life is good as a wonderful gift from a good creator, but that it is not the ultimate good. There are some things that are worth giving up your precious life for. As American theologian Stanley Hauerwas says: ‘Dying is not the tragedy but … dying for the wrong thing’. Christians repudiated the Roman cult of noble suicide to preserve one’s honour. But they certainly accepted that a violent death might well be the price of a life lived in the service of God. Greater love has no-one than this: to lay down one’s life for one’s friends.

What the martyrs show us is that death is unavoidable – but that the manner in which one dies may remarkably affirm human life. If a death affirms human life it must do so by affirming the communities of trust and care that are basic to human existence. One of the basic conditions that shapes human community is our willingness to live and our assumption that others share it.

If we have some manner of control about the manner of our dying, then, let us rule out the possibility that the voluntary euthanasia proposal may well afford us. Because death seems so lonely, the temptation to which we may succumb is to think of our dying as an isolated incident quite apart from anyone else. What is in fact the case is that in calling on others to assist us in ending our life, we are normalising this manner of death. We are inviting the medical profession to ask why the person in the next bed has not chosen the same but is insisting on staying alive when the bed is needed and the palliative care is expensive. We are inviting our community to increase its loveless-ness towards the elderly and the sick – after all, if their choice is to stay alive, then they can be blamed for it.

Law is a blunt instrument in the moral life. I am not heedless that the change in the law is sought for the purpose of alleviating great suffering. But the law can help us here by preparing us for the human-ness of our death. It can restrain us from insisting on a death which will corrode the community’s commitment to care for the elderly and the sick. It can restrain our tendency to see the aging population as an accounting problem. It can restrain us from investing far too much moral authority in the medical profession, under the illusion that men and woman of science deal only in tangible facts. It can restrain us from on insisting on a right to die which comes at the cost of another’s right to stay alive.

The pressure on the sick, the disabled and the dying is already there. We cannot, as those who are schooled in the gospel of Jesus Christ, commit to a policy which deepens their abandonment, nor can we commend it to our community.

Friday, April 08, 2011

Thursday, April 07, 2011

Sublime Depravity - Human nature and the arts IV

What might humans “do” with the arts? Will we be wasting our time in creating art or thinking about it when “the time is short”? Will art have a diverting or even corrupting influence on us, leading us to idolatry or immorality? Surely not. Art is a good part of God’s good creation; the freedom, ability and materials necessary to produce art are his gifts. Yet, like everything created, it is in bondage to decay as a result of sin (Rom 8:20-1). The effect of Christ’s work is not just a return to the way things were, but promises a transformation of creation (Rev 21:5). However, that redeemed people are satisfied with cosy banality when they have a foretaste of such splendours is bewildering and disappointing. Having glimpsed eternity in the resurrection of Jesus, will we not be more aware of that which demeans our humanity? As we reform our bodies in conformity with their heavenly destiny, so oughtn’t we to reform our imaginations in line with Paul’s evocation of the true, honourable, just, pure, pleasing, commendable and praiseworthy in Phil 4:8? In the best hymns, for example, are united words that are neither merely theologically correct nor trite but rich and evocative with music that serves those who sing it by lifting their spirits in glorifying God. Neither sentimentality nor mere formalism have a place. The Christian hope gives us confidence there is in the arts potential for real communication and pleasure. The Christian hope gives us a grasp of reality that richly informs discussions of the arts. The Christian hope speaks of God’s judgement, and thus allows for a thorough critique of the abuses of art. The Christian hope also draws our imaginations to Christ. There is then every good reason for a Christian delight in the arts. Indeed, for Christians to maintain that there is a real joy in the arts glorifies God. Far from wasting time, they are (potentially) a redemption of time. The arts, created and experienced under the fear of God, have, like sex, their own peculiar ecstatic holiness.

Wednesday, April 06, 2011

Sublime Depravity - Human nature and the arts III


Can art be a “redeeming of the disorder mirroring God’s redeeming work in Christ”? Could creative endeavour be a part of the re-creation? There is a danger in speaking as if the arts in themselves extend Christ’s work, or as if artistic “inspiration” could be akin to “sanctification”. However, we can view human art as anticipatory. When order is wrested from the hands of chaos in a work of art, may we not catch a glimpse of the final goal of creation? The human imagination knows that something is not right with the present world. Art can turn us in the direction of a perfection we do not possess. The Christian is aided by the theme of Sabbath, which encapsulates this tension: while being a chance for enjoyment of God’s creation, it is also a reminder of the future “rest” not yet attained, but promised in Christ. There is no natural theology in the human arts; but the arts may display inklings of what Christians know and worship. In his speech at the Areopagus in Acts 17, Paul is able to take the words of a pagan poet - “For we too are his offspring” - as his text. Even art such as Francis Bacon’s - which explicitly denies God - is still asking the God-question.

Of course, I can also hear Karl Barth’s thundering “Nein!” Barth was emphatic that there was no relation at all between the arts and theology. And yet his love of Mozart’s music led him to make the astonishing claim that the composer should hold a “place in theology, especially in the doctrine of creation and in eschatology” . He wrote in the context of a discussion of the “shadowside” of creation, thinking of finitude and all its effects. Barth heard in Mozart an expression of the goodness of creation, including its limits; and that “creation praises its Master and is therefore perfect.” This is in harmony with the Wisdom literature. Inklings of God are present in the human arts (just as they are in nature); the Christian has been given the eyes to see them. The musical, poetic and painterly renditions of the human condition may take us to the “very threshold of transcendence and the theological;” but it is only encounter with Christ that takes us over it. Works of art are altars to an Unkown God - the God that makes himself known in the glory of the incarnate Word.

Tuesday, April 05, 2011

Sublime Depravity - Human nature and the arts II

In thinking theologically about the arts we will be naturally attracted to the doctines of creation, humanity, and revelation. But it must be stated from the outset that all of these have a disctinctive Christ-shape in true Christian thought; so that we will need to bring Christ to bear at every point of our discussion. Creation is dependent on God - but is not God. The doctrine of the Trinity helps to explain how God may relate to the world and yet not be the world. Further, unity and diversity are both true aspects of the created order. Humanity is given a unique role in the creation as the divine viceroy. Creation was not created “perfect” in some Parmenidean sense, but “very good”. It was in need of subduing, naming and enjoying. Human beings were given the capacity to imagine, to describe, to exercise choice; and to become second-order creators, working to shape God’s creation according to these gifts. John Calvin even went as far as to say that the human capacity for art is innate. Built into the structure of the world was the Sabbath, a rest for humans from their work. Art is a part of the subduing, naming and enjoying of God’s world: it interacts with creation and gives it order and new significance. The incarnation further reminds us that matter is not intrinsically evil. Conversely, the Christian doctrine of creation does not allow the human being to worship the creation, even when he or she makes it into art. The wisdom literature of the Old Testament explores the relationship of man and woman to God and to creation. “The fear of Yahweh” is the principle which explains both the freedom and the limit of human wisdom. On the one hand, humble service of and deference to the mighty creator and sustainer of the cosmos enables a person to comprehend experience, because it recognises divine order. There is no sacred/secular division - all the world is God’s. On the other hand, the phrase is a reminder of the limits placed on human wisdom. It recognises the hubris of men and women, and rebukes it. Above all, Jesus Christ provides the model of true human wisdom; and as Paul explains (1 Cor 1-2), Christ’s cross is the wisdom of God in action, confounding proud human wisdom. “The fear of Yahweh”, then, provides a useful motto for discussion of the arts. Christology declares the radical fallenness of the world—the miracle of the incarnation illustrates the depth of the despair. Goodness, beauty and truth are disrupted. Ugliness and disorder arise. While God’s order remains, humanity’s contact with that order is tenuous. However, the advent of Jesus Christ points us beyond the fall to the reconciliation of all things in Christ. The world, which was made through Christ, runs to the order of Christ. As art eloquently explains, human society is troubled by death. Christ’s resurrection from the dead points to the end of death’s rule and to the future transformation of the present order. The testimony of the Apostles is to the resurrected Christ’s Lordship over the world. What occurs in Christ is a re-creation - a new humanity is formed, by the Holy Spirit, in the present age. This is a people with imaginations re-formed as hope in Christ. They experience a present resurrected reality (John 10:10, Col 3:1-5); and they anticipate the perfecting of their bodies by godly obedience expressed in service. Here is the beauty of holiness, rather than the holiness of beauty. A similar kind of inversion is achieved in the pattern of God’s work in Christ. The image and glory of divinity itself, Christ emptied himself of all claims to equality with God, and submitted himself to the ugliness of the cross. Isaiah wrote of the Suffering Servant: “ - so marred was his appearance, beyond human semblance, and his form beyond that of mortals -” (52:14). The cross is a moment of grotesque ugliness; and yet also it is moment when a restoration of beauty is wrought. Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar compared faith to an aesthetic contemplation of the God’s work in the world. What God has done in redemption through Christ is itself a work of art, and one that counters proud human ideas of beauty. The doctrine of revelation points to the Christ’s uniqueness as God’s Word. Both visual and verbal descriptions are used of him: he is the “Word” and the “image” of God (John 1, Col 1). The arts then, do not contain of themselves a revelation, however they might mimic it. Yet given the success of God’s communicative act in Christ, we can have confidence that there is an order to creation and that are more than merely arbitrary meanings in art. Ultimately, the cosmos, though marked by sin, is a coherent realm in which meaningful artistic interactions may take place.

Monday, April 04, 2011

Sublime Depravity - Human nature and the arts I


Dorothy Sayers once wrote:

The Church as a body has never made up her mind about the Arts, and it is hardly too much to say that she has never tried. She has, of course, from time to time puritanically denounced the Arts as irreligious and mischievous, or tried to exploit the Arts as a means to the teaching of religion and morals....And there had...been plenty of writers on aesthetics who happened to be Christians, but they seldom made any consistent attempt to relate their aesthetic to the central Christian dogmas.

The goal of this paper is take up Sayer’s challenge by attempting to relate the arts to the major themes of the Christian faith. By “the arts” I mean the whole gamut of human imaginative and creative activity, including literary, musical, architectural, theatrical, visual, and even televisual arts. Art involves the imaginative arrangement and presentation of matter, such as words, or paint, or notes. It is universal and ubiquitous—no human society is without some form of art, and virtually no human being would live out of contact with art. The arts are held to engender an aesthetic response, meaning that something more than a merely sensory or intellectual or even emotional may be felt when we experience art.

Like work, art is cursed. As Nicholas Wolterstorff writes:

Art is not isolated from the radical fallenness of our nature. It is an instrument of it. Art does not lift us out of the radical evil of our history but plunges us into it. Art is not man’s saviour but a willing accomplice in our crimes.

The human imagination reveals its own fallenness in its art. Not only do inherently corrupt forms of art—blasphemy, pornography, idolatry, kitsch, propaganda—proliferate; but our expressions of order are subject to chaos, and our hopes are subject to despair. And yet the arts have the capacity to elevate us, to provide some of our most glorious moments, to show us most in tune with ourselves and the world, even to give us inklings of the divine. As within man and woman themselves, there remains the tension between the potential both for great beauty and also great vileness.
The Christian response to the arts has been likewise rather ambivalent, for several reasons. First, the strength of the second commandment has been taken as a warning against depictions of the divine. Christ is the only true image (eikon) of God (Col 1:15): our imaginations are not permitted liberty concerning Him.


Second, the gospel mission (because “the time is short”) holds an absolute precedence over artistic activity. The old created order is beyond redemption (it is said) and will soon be exposed to fire. The human arts have no eternal value; so that they are not worth cultivating.

Third, since art often involves the outward expression of the inward state of the human psyche, evangelical Christians, who have a strong doctrine of inner sinfulness, may well fear what such expression reveals. That is, the public projection in art of inner depravity may draw a censorious response, rather than an intelligently engaged one, from conservative Christians.


Fourth, Protestant evangelicals have displayed a suspicion of metaphor and representation—which are central to the arts—perhaps derived from the priority of the sensus literalis in scripture reading.

Fifth, as the religious and the aesthetic are felt by some modern theologians to be responses to the same thing, more orthodox Christians have recoiled from the arts. Paul Tillich saw in art an revelatory expression of the “Ultimate Concern”. The beautiful is also holy and transcendent. For Tillich, art and theology both touch on what really “is”. Certainly, modern artists such as Wassily Kandinsky and Marc Rothko have painted as if this was the case. However, for those who would uphold the Christ revealed in the scriptures as God’s unique revelation, Tillich’s claim for art is extremely unsatisfactory. But what is to be said, thought and felt about the arts if what is said is to be theologically accurate?

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

Love and Loss

Tennyson’s doubt is in many ways very contemporary. Like us, he was stunned and exhilarated by the pace of technological change. The power of experimental and observational science to explain the natural world seemed to make God somewhat surplus to requirements. The traditional concept of God was, so it seemed, redundant. The rationalistic philosophy of the age, when applied to biblical studies and to theology more generally, did much to erode confidence in a verbal revelation of God given in a propositional form.

But this did not, then as now, lead to a decline in religious belief as such. Rather, it sought out new forms. If religious faith could not be established by reason, perhaps experience might provide an alternative channel to the divine. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, theologians began to emphasise the more mystical and experiential aspects of Christian faith. Religious dogmas were not to be taken as direct descriptions of realities but rather as metaphors for encounters with the divine. Though people like Tennyson did not feel that they could any longer accept Christian orthodoxy, they were reluctant to pursue pure atheism. There was inside them a deep conviction that there was something transcendent. Not that they could name it, or give it a face – they could only grope towards it in the dark.

And then there was the experience of love and loss. Perhaps the Victorians in their time, before the wide acceptance of Darwinian views, were more ready to sanctify these powerful feelings. They seemed to come from some extra-phenomenal source; to be an intimation of immortality. We are more ready to see the pains and joys of human fellowship as demanded of us by our biological selves than as evidence of a holiness beyond us. Nevertheless, the popular sense of the ‘spiritual’ remains in many people, and permeates these moments at which heart is most evidently exposed. It is in our most intimate relationships that we feel most connected to the truth about who we are as individuals and most certain about our steps into the world; and we have the gratifying experience of being able to provide this for others. The reciprocity of human relationships take us beyond ourselves to ourselves.

Death remained the final, impermeable barrier. Poets of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries like John Donne certainly feared death as the curtailment of love and the rotting of the human body. Death was a demonic, personified figure who stalked his victims. Donne needs to draw on all the resources of his Christian faith to repudiate it in ‘Death be not proud’. But the grieving of the nineteenth century wails in a different key – one that we moderns more readily recognise. The loss is not felt as the result of being tyrannised by a sinister force. It is now a brute fact in a remorseless universe which is governed only by a God who remains unmoved at the plight of the creatures who experience it. To face death or to grieve is not be part of a dramatic struggle in which Mordor has temporarily got the upper hand. It is at least possible to express anger against that force. Death for a Tennyson and for we his twenty-first century descendants is sad and bewildering. It flaps its wings in the face of our confidence in human technological mastery of the world.

I falter where I firmly trod: Tennyson and doubt



Alfred Tennyson was indeed a striking young man, over six feet tall and powerfully built. The mass of his somewhat unkempt black hair was set upon a noble head. His face carried an intense expression of melacholy.

The son of a gloomy Lincolnshire clergyman, he arrived at Cambridge in 1827 already an accomplished and precocious poet. The Somersby rectory had been a dysfunctional household to say the least, with the eleven children largely left to amuse themselves by wandering around the local marshes and fens. If Tennyson was shy at first, his prodigious ability and intensity of personality soon attracted others; and he found some companionship in an intellectual society known as ‘The Apostles’.

In Tennyson’s second year at Cambridge, another young man arrived at the University who would become the kind of intimate friend that his childhood had lacked. His name was Arthur Hallam, the son of a leading historian and scholar, and in his own way remarkably gifted. In the cynicism of the times in which we live, we have lost the ability to talk about the power and the depth of friendship without hinting at some sexual overtone.

There was no hint of anything erotic in the relationship between the two men. That would be to miss just how profound the intimacy of their friendship became as a friendship. Indeed, Hallam became engaged to Tennyson’s sister Emily. They shared not in an amorous passion, but in the delights of intellectual discovery and in the vigorous discussion of any topic they could think of. They shared with one another their difficulty they found at maintaining religious belief and yet the sense of loss they felt in not believing. Criticism of the text of the Bible and scientific discoveries about the age of the earth had appeared to challenge the faith of many of the best minds at Cambridge; and Tennyson and Hallam were no different. Certainly nothing in Tennyson’s upbringing at the rectory would have commended Christian faith to him as anything but a burden to be borne.

The summer of 1833 began with Hallam spending time at the Tennyson home in rural Lincolnshire, in the English midlands. These were memorable weeks – a sweet time that Tennyson would always remember with some sense of pain because they were never to be repeated. In August, Hallam’s father took him on a journey to the European continent. On Sept 15th, Henry Hallam returned to his hotel in Vienna only to discover his son in an armchair, dead of a cerebral haemorrhage.

The blow this struck to Tennyson was overwhelming. His grandson, Sir Charles Tennyson, would later write:

The sudden extinction of his friend, with all his infinite capacity for affection and his brilliant promise, struck at the very roots of his will to live. Could it really be that all this great spiritual treasure was annihilated: that all human love and all man’s spiritual effort are but a momentary ripple on the ocean of eternity? Was the world wholly without purpose and man an irresponsible toy for the gigantic forces of Nature? If so, what value could there be in life?

If you have ever had a chance to walk about a Victorian graveyard you will be struck by the openness and even sentimentality with which they regarded death. We are not unlike them, in that terrible griefs affect us too. But we have less experience of them, and fewer words with which to express our loss. We are not given to the public elaboration of our feelings – we do not feel that anyone would be interested in our thoughts about the brevity of life and the nearness of our mortality.

But Tennyson was to make an art form of grieving. He was too sorrowed to attend the funeral, and did not visit Hallam’s tomb until after he was married. But he could not stop his pen:
Tears, idle tears, I know not what they mean,
Tears from the depth of some divine despair
Rise in the heart and gather to the eyes,
In looking on the happy Autumn-fields,
And thinking of the days that are no more.

Dear as remembered kisses after death,
And sweet as those by hapless fancy feigned
On lips that are for others; deep as love,
Deep as first love, and wild with all regret;
Death in Life, the days that are no more.

The poem which made Tennyson’s career as a poet, In Memoriam A.H.H., is a lengthy reflection on the death of his friend which did not appear for seventeen further years. It is a poem of grief at the loss of a dear friend. But it also a poem about the pain of losing faith. Tennyson was one of the great doubters of his age. His was still very much a Christianised society, and in general traditionally orthodox Christian views held sway. However, developments in astronomy and geology had seemed to contradict Biblical cosmology as it had been traditionally understood. The world was not new, but rather very, very ancient. The universe was far more vast than had been previously imagined. It seemed less and less that humankind occupied anything like a significant place in that universe. If humankind felt small, and lonely, there was at the same time an optimism about human technological progress. This was the age of the industrial revolution, of the steam engine and the factory. People still wanted to believe, but wanted to do so in all sincerity given what they now knew about the world. Was there a way forward for them?
Added to this for Tennyson was the personal existential crisis occasioned by the loss of his friend. It seemed to be exactly the kind of random occurrence that would characterise a heartless universe. And yet, he was not ready to give up on faith entirely. Here’s a passage from In Memoriam:

I falter where I firmly trod,
And falling with my weight of cares
Upon the great world's altar-stairs
That slope thro' darkness up to God,

I stretch lame hands of faith, and grope,
And gather dust and chaff, and call
To what I feel is Lord of all,
And faintly trust the larger hope.

All that is happening and all that has happened to him has led to uncertainty. His feet now ‘falter’, where once before he had been confident of his footfall upon the ground of faith. His ‘weight of cares’ – primarily his deep sense of loss for his friend – causes him to fall upon the ‘world’s altar-stairs’. The picture reminds me of the burden Christian carries in John Bunyan’s great Christian classic Pilgrim’s Progress. Only this burden is not the poet’s sin, but rather his ‘weight of cares’. The path to God (a stairway to heaven?) is shrouded in darkness. He is not yet ready to declare that this is a road to nowhere, to cite the Talking Heads. But all he can do is reach out his ‘lame hands of faith, and grope’. He can have no certainty about what he is reaching for, but only in the end a faint trust. The ‘dust and chaff’ that gathers suggests the dust to which Adam is told he will return in Genesis 3 on account of the curse. It is a mark of mortality and an intimation of death. The poet calls, not to a personal God who reveals himself in the traditional and Biblical sense, but rather to ‘what I feel is Lord of all’. Who or what is this dark divinity, shrouded in mystery and unknowability? He hopes for a hand to reach out to meet his groping arm, but with no confidence, however much he wishes it. What is the ‘larger hope’? He doesn’t quite know, other than to say that hope is, perhaps inexplicably, part of his experience too.
Tennyson became famous through this poem because its themes of grief, loss and doubt resonated deeply with his Victorian contemporaries. The twentieth century poet T.S. Eliot wrote of In Memoriam: 'It is not religious because of the quality of its faith, but because of the quality of its doubt.’ It was profound in the honesty with which it faced the most difficult and personal questions of all – to do with love and death.

Tennyson was unshaken in his conviction that his friend had lived on in some form; and he never
rejected belief in the existence of God. One of his last poems was the famous ‘Crossing the Bar’, an expression of hope at life’s end:

Twilight and evening bell,
And after that the dark!
And may there be no sadness of farewell,
When I embark;

For tho' from out our bourne of Time and Place
The flood may bear me far,
I hope to see my Pilot face to face
When I have crossed the bar.

But despite believing in the immortality of the soul and in his ‘Pilot’, it could never be said that he was an orthodox Christian believer in any sense. That conviction had long been shaken loose from him in his sorrows.

The atheists are right

My piece at Anglican Media this week

Monday, March 14, 2011

Seeking Common Ground

In debating the issue of same-sex marriage on Facebook recently, a journalist friend of mine stated that he had not found any ‘convincing non-religious arguments’ that would prevent a change to the marriage act.

‘Non-religious arguments’: it sounds like a reasonable requirement for any public discussion, doesn’t it? The argument goes something like this. I am certainly free to hold views based on entirely religious reasons; but when I step into the public square, I must shed these and speak in an entirely non-religious way if I am to convince. I might believe that left-handed people ought to be banned from public transport because an angel told me, but in seeking to convince others of this view I need to leave the angels behind and argue on an angel-free basis. Otherwise I am simply attempting to ‘impose my views on others’.

Former British PM Tony Blair encountered this resistance to public religious speech a number of times. He was once told by his spin doctor Alastair Campbell, when he was about to talk about his Christian faith in an interview with Vanity Fair, that ‘we don’t do God’. Later, when Blair said that he was ultimately answerable to God for commanding the invasion of Iraq, he was met with a withering barrage of attacks from media pundits who were alarmed that this might mean a somehow unjustifiable intrusion of the religious into the political at the highest level.

The alarmed reaction that Blair experienced is not because these ‘religious’ reasons are not convincing to many people. Plainly, religious reasons do have an enormous power to convince many people, even in the UK and Australia. Evoking the ‘image of God’, for example, is an extremely powerful component in an argument for social equality. It was heard frequently on the lips of Archbishop Desmond Tutu in the years of apartheid. When the leaders of the mainline churches speak, it is evident that they are given a hearing – if not always by the media, then certainly by the wider public. They can in fact openly appeal to the Bible or to theological ideas as part of their public utterances. If they want to get their point across to many people they need not, it seems, have one way of speaking in the cloister and another in the plaza .

It is not then because of lack of effectiveness that there is an appeal to trade only in ‘non-religious’ reasoning. Rather the opposite: the fear is that these religious arguments are all too effective. But it seems as if religious arguments are not open to the kind of scrutiny that non-religious ones are. They cannot convince the non-religious, and so they are imposed (if they can be) by majorities, or by noisy minorities. Secularists want to object that even if these reasons are compelling to lots of people they are illegitimately used as public reasons.

I think three particular questions are worth putting in response to the claim that public reasons ought always to be ‘non-religious’. First: is it in fact the case that the line between ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ is as easy to determine as it sounds? An argument based on a passage of the Bible, for example, sounds as if it is obviously going to fall into the ‘religious’ (and therefore illegitimate) camp. But you could easily make a case that the Bible has an historic moral authority in Western culture, government and law quite apart from any sense that it is the revealed Word of God, as orthodox Christians hold. For example, an appeal to Jesus’ teaching to ‘love your neighbour as yourself’ would be entirely acceptable to most people in a public debate. Would such an appeal amount to a ‘non-religious’ reason? Or is it ‘religious’?

Conversely, when a politician makes an appeal to ‘Australian values’ or to ‘the ANZAC spirit’, are these not ‘religious’ claims? When they speak in this way, they draw on a mythology about the past that is not subject to quantification or contradiction in an economic or scientific sense. They are appealing to a sense of civic piety that is arguably every bit as religious as the public utterances of a bishop. In fact, the original meaning of the word ‘religious’, which comes from the Latin word religare (‘to bind, fasten’), had everything to do with the sorts of public duties and civic values of Rome to which the citizenry were bound. ‘Religion’ in this sense is very much part of the public space.

Second: are ‘religious’ arguments so hermetically-sealed that they are not in fact open to challenge and counter-claim from those who do not share them? In many cases, the secular commentator feels quite happy to intervene in religious discourse. As an example we could cite the judgement frequently offered in the media that there are ‘fundamentalist’ Muslims or Christians, and that this is a bad form of religion. From a secular standpoint commentators feel that it is legitimate to criticise the wearing of the burqa or female circumcision (for example).
What’s more, arguments that religious people put forward are not usually as simplistic as ‘an angel told me’, despite the way in which they are often portrayed. Each of the Christian denominations, for example, is in possession of extensive traditions of reasoning from their foundational principles and dogmas – reasoning which is in principle available to be understood and debated by others, especially when it is used to make arguments in favour of this or that public policy. That is not to say that there won’t be significant and passionate disagreement on what constitutes a valid argument, but an argument is better than silence.

If the first two questions were an appeal to secularists to relax a bit about ‘religious’ reasoning into public debate, the third question is one for the Christian church: is it not the case that we owe our neighbours a ‘reason for the hope that is within you?’ (1 Peter 3:15). In other words: in public debate, victory isn’t everything. We could simply say: it is not worth discussing the matter, since enough people accept our point of view without explanation in any case. This is how a lot of politics gets done, unfortunately. I think this would be an unacceptable abuse of the public space. Secularists may not agree with the reasons that we put forward, but it honours the sanctity (if I may use such theological language!) of the process of public debate about our common life if we at least seek to persuade those with whom we disagree.

Friday, March 11, 2011

Overcome with emotion?


In October 2004, my mother-in-law died of breast cancer at the age of 62, not much more than a year after being diagnosed. Being the only member of the family experienced at public speaking – and indeed, at running funerals - I was quite willing to take on the duties of giving the eulogy at the funeral service when I was asked to by my father-in-law. In addition, since I was Jackie’s son-in-law and not directly related to her, I could be expected and indeed expected myself to maintain my composure in the delivery of the task in a suitably controlled tone, allowing the mourners to grieve in quiet privacy.

The tears, then, took me quite by surprise. I was not far into retelling Jackie’s life story – from her childhood in London to her arrival in Australia in the 1960s and her conversion to faith in Christ. At some point in this narrative, I was quite overcome by the occasion. My voice quavered; I could feel myself flushing red; and my face contorted itself. I could barely continue to read, because I couldn’t see the page in front of me. What words I could get out were squeezed out through my throat, and I found myself gasping for breath in between watery sobs. Afterwards my six year old son said to me ‘your face was all screwed up, Dad’.


I retell this story not because I am hoping to elicit sympathy but rather because of its ordinariness as an episode of the human emotions at work. The strong emotion seemed to come to me in a way that I couldn’t predict. It was as if there were a force outside of me working on me and causing me to lose self-control of my body in a way that was understandable but still within Anglo-Saxon culture somewhat shameful, especially for men. I am not normally conscious of doing things with my body that I don’t directly will. Yet in this moment, normal operations seemed to be suspended and the emotion took control of me.


It is an ordinary episode, but no less complicated for being so. It illustrates how troublesome emotions are in thinking cohesively about human being. This difficulty pans out in three overlapping ways, to do with agency, the body and reason.


The first difficulty is best explained by asking: in what sense was I an agent of my own sobs? Can I really speak in this way, of an emotion controlling me, since the emotion could not be anyone else’s? The sobs certainly emanated from my mouth and in my voice. They happened to and in my body. But I was not intending or willing to sob; in fact, I was willing the opposite. Yet I sobbed, and not some demon that had entered me, or some ventriloquist pretending to be me.
Second, at the moment of intense emotion, the human being seems to become almost alienated from his own body. Because these emotions are exhibited in such an obviously visceral fashion and yet carry with them unwanted consequences such as the stigma of cultural shame, the human subject may feel that ‘I’ am other from my physical body. There must be then a purer, non-physical form of ‘me’ – to which perhaps I can ascend once I am free of the untrustworthiness of my flesh. Even a more honourably perceived emotion like the feeling of loss shares enough in common with the more base desires of our bodies – feelings like hunger, sexual desire, need for sleep – that in experiencing it we still frequently experience this otherness from our bodies. Indeed, if I am to speak of some ‘higher’ set of emotions, where do I ‘feel’ them if not in my body?


Third, my perception of myself as a primarily rational creature is disturbed by the experience of strong emotion. But this is because of a hidden assumption that ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ are discrete centres of my person, with reason the more nearly ‘spiritual’ or more distinctly human of the two. Yet my strong emotion was in fact tied to rational propositions about the occasion. I did not feel at all the same way about the funeral, at which I had ministered, for a woman in her early forties who had committed suicide even though the circumstances were arguably more tragic. I knew Jacky as my friend and mother-in-law, and as my wife’s mother and the granny of my own children. I could calculate what her loss would mean for us. In fact, the more I thought about it, the more I felt about it.

These difficulties are enough to engender a philosophical, psychological and anthropological discussion of the emotions, such as philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum provides in her masterful work Upheavals of Thought – The Intelligence of the Emotions. The task of a theological anthropology, however, is to begin analysing questions like this in the light of a particular context, namely God. For a Christian anthropology, that context is framed by the themes of the creation of man and woman in the image of God on the one hand and the presence of sin in human life on the other. These two themes are set in tension with one another not just in the Biblical story, but in the existence of every human person. To what degree is this or that feature of my humanity reflect my likeness as a creature made in the divine image to the creator? Or is it in some way a result of that disorder of personhood that stems from my participation in human fallen-ness? But Christian anthropology will also speak of a destiny for human beings. The two themes of theological anthropology have their resolution however in the person and work of Jesus Christ. Theological anthropology, like all properly Christian theology, must speak an evangelical word, in which the image of God humankind is redeemed and perfected. It has, in the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, a pattern to which human creatures will one day be conformed (Rom 8:29).

Returning to my troublesome emotions, then: was this event God’s will for creatureliness in me? If God has no ‘body, parts or passions’, and yet my emotions are an irreducibly physical component of me, ought I in seeking to be more like him look to some future beyond or without my body? Or must I think of myself dualistically, as most of the Christian tradition has done, having a distinct ‘soul’ for the purer emotions like joy and hope as well as a body for my appetites like hunger and thirst? Has ‘reason’, or the ‘rational soul’ a more exalted seat in me? What would an account of the human emotions look like in the light of the resurrection of the dead? In what sense can the three problematic aspects of human emotion – to do with agency, body and reason – be addressed from a theological perspective?

Thursday, March 03, 2011

How to destroy a human being

In 2004 a series of images seeped out into the world’s media that seemed to emerge from the pit of hell itself. Abu Ghraib prison had been known, under the rule of Saddam Hussein, as the closed door behind which the very worst of his terrors was carried out. By now in the hands of the conquering US military, it was evident that the means and methods of prisoner treatment had not significantly changed. The pictures revealed that a programme of torture, rape, abuse and humiliation was part of the experience of daily life at Abu Ghraib under US control.
It is the unselfconsciousness of the images that is perhaps what is so disturbing about them. They look like a series of holiday snaps – the toothy grins and thumbs-up gestures of the US guards point to the camaraderie they were evidently feeling in their shared experience. They seem utterly detached from the prisoners whom, by complete contrast, lie prone and passive or cringe in terror. They recoil from the lunges of dogs. They stand masturbating while a female guard watches and points. They lie in naked pyramids of flesh. They hang by their chained wrists from the bars of their cells. In one image, a hooded Iraqi prisoner stands elevated on a box with his arms outstretched. His fingers are attached by metal clips to wires. He is clearly under the impression that the wires are electrified, and that he is about to experience extreme pain and possibly death.

Torture is usually the most secret of acts, usually concealed from the world by the thickness of prison walls. Torturers do not like to put their work on their public record. Though posing the prisoners for photographs as if they were some tourist attraction seemed to be part of the torture itself, it was also a naïve mistake. It revealed what was meant to be kept hidden. Here finally we could catch a glimpse of the torturers craft from the inside. It made the world witnesses to their work, and led to the shame and imprisonment of the perpetrators – if not those who ordered them to carry out a ‘hard’ interrogation.

There was also in the revelation of the photographs in the western media the shocking realisation that the torturers were not operating at the behest of a Saddam or a Mugabe or a Pinochet, but were the representatives of a modern, liberal western democracy. The self-image of westerners as enlightened and reasonable people was shattered. In fact, democracies have not ever ceased to deploy torture as a method. In his book Torture and Democray, US-Iranian political scientist Darius Rejali shows how even modern democracies have used torture – those regimes that describe themselves as humane and supportive of human rights. The terrible secret at the heart of democratic regimes is that even in the name of humanity we led to destroy the human – an act that is ultimately self-destructive. As the Vatican foreign minister Archbishop Giovanni Lajolo said: ‘The torture? A more serious blow to the United States than September 11, 2001 attacks. Except that the blow was not inflicted by terrorists but by Americans against themselves.’ Attempts to isolate the prison guards Lynndie England and Charles Graner from the military hierarchy and to depict them as uneducated and Southern were a predictable response from the media and the judiciary to the possibility of a general complicity in the acts that were depicted in the photographs.

As the Abu Ghraib photographs reveal, in torture bodily pain is only one aspect of the process and interrogation for information is only one of the goals. In fact, torture involves the deconstruction and dismemberment of the human person – which is both its overriding purpose and its means. In his remarkable book Torture and Eucharist US theologian Cavanaugh cites the case study of Arturo, a torture victim of the Pinochet regime in Chile. Arturo told his therapist: ‘I feel as though I were not myself’ (p. 41).

Thus, in torture we can observe in a chilling way a kind of negative anthropology: the torturer has to tacitly acknowledge what a human being is, in order to pull him apart. Evil speaks a kind of truth - in order to undo it, it has to acknowledge it. In torture we have a perverse revelation of the human in the attempt to make her disappear. The horror of torture shows us how vulnerable a human is, too: that our bodily life places us in the path of circumstances that may separate us from ourselves.

Wednesday, March 02, 2011

Is Ned Flanders a Violent Man?

For Australian readers, my piece 'Is Ned Flanders a Violent Man?' has been published in Quadrant magazine.

Thursday, February 24, 2011

Trusting to Know

What are the practices of knowledge that cultivate the necessary trust under which it flourishes? Firstly, listening to the Word of God is an essential practice – not because the Bible is an epistemological text book, but because (as we have seen) it tells us with remarkable explanatory power about ourselves as knowers and the world we seek to know. It is because that Word of God is a divine declaration of the significance and meaningfulness of all we know. The scriptural gospel both encourages us in our human capacity and rebukes our pride. Along its spine is the story of the divine creator whose unshakable commitment is to the world that he has made and the men and women who inhabit it. Though human beings may know truly and even know truth without knowing Christ, they cannot know without him. Knowledge flourishes best within earshot of the gospel of Jesus Christ.

Second, curiosity about God’s world is an appropriate expression of the creation mandate. That humankind has an almost insatiable thirst for knowledge about the world in which they live and of which they are a part is part of the way we were designed to interact with the creation that we might serve it. The contemporary epidemic of boredom – and particularly, of boredom with the real (as opposed to virtual) world – is deeply dehumanizing. Christian educators must surely seek to give nurture to the curiosity of students about the created order. An environment in which the activity of knowing is celebrated and enjoyed is essential to the flourishing of human beings as knowing animals.

Third, the cultivation of the virtue of epistemological humility is indispensible to true knowledge of the world. The scientific method itself, properly understood, recognizes the limitations and provisionality of human knowledge – without thereby despairing about the possibility of knowledge. The proper basis for the growth of human knowledge is the admission of incompleteness and even error. This is one of those truths that we can learn from observation; but it finds its confirmation and explanation in the gospel word which judges human beings. Schools must teach their students to say ‘I don’t know’ and ‘I was wrong’. Without these phrases, there is less chance to say ‘I know’.

Fourth, as knowing is a collective practice, a critical respect for tradition and for knowledge from and of other cultures enhances the ability of human beings to know. The current shape of most curricula recognizes this. However, it is not only essential to recognize that history is an important subject in and of itself, but that each subject area has its own history of inquiry, error, revision and understanding. Tradition is not prescriptive. It requires a practice of receiving it respectfully but critically. Anglican Christians in particular are well placed, as heirs of the sixteenth century reformation, to accord to the traditions of human knowledge the kind of critical respect that enables its development. Learning to see from the perspective of other cultures is also a marvelous aid towards the development of a proper regard for one’s own subjectivity.

Fifth, enabling communities of trust – trust in the coherence and meaningfulness of the world, in the potential for meaningfulness of human words, and so on – is the basis for the transformation of domestic and public life. By contrast, the erosion of trust in the political and economic sphere is deeply destructive of community. As we have seen, there is an urgent need for the schooling future citizens in the responsibilities that come with the possession of knowledge and the virtues that are needed for maintaining it.

Tuesday, February 15, 2011

KNOWLEDGE IN CHRIST (OLIVER O’DONOVAN)

The work of Anglican evangelical moral theologian Oliver O’Donovan in his landmark book Resurrection and Moral Order provides a constructive account of the nature of knowledge in Christ. While his purpose is to provide a description of how specifically moral knowledge can be accessed, his schema certainly invites application across a broader field. O’Donovan addresses the question, as we have here, of how it is that we can say truthfully that we know things about the order of created universe when we ourselves belong to it and cannot find a vantage point to consider it from above (as God does)? What kind of knowledge does the gospel invite us to seek and entitle us to say that we have, and to try to impart to those we educate? O’Donovan sketches four features:

a. OF THINGS AS PART OF THE WHOLE
In the first place, this knowledge in Christ is knowledge of things ‘in their relations to the totality of things’. That does not mean that it is given to human beings to know everything, or even of everything. But we do know what we know as part of a coherent whole. The universe has a purpose and an order, the broad outline of which is discernible in the evangel. If the restoration and fulfillment of the created order is announced to us in the gospel of Jesus Christ, then it is possible to see that the world which we inhabit is a totality. The things and events we encounter in the world, though they may not in themselves look significant, gain significance from their connectedness to other things and events. These together make up a unified totality of objects and occurrences.
Seeking to grasp the shape of this totality has been until relatively recently one of the primary tasks of human knowers. It was this idea that stood behind the founding of the modern universities, even as late as the 19th century. Science and religion were not held apart but were invited to enrich one another mutually – for knowledge could not be total without both perspectives. We moderns benefit in every way from their partnership. The fragmentation and specialization of knowledge which we have latterly experienced is evidence of a despair that things could ever been known completely and in all their relations.

b. FROM WITHIN
At the same time this knowledge is known by knowers who are themselves a part of what they know. Though it is the empirical scientist’s ideal, we never can know at a distance. We are only artificially able to isolate the objects of our inquiry. We cannot transcend the things we seek to know. The historian is herself an historical being; the biologist part of a biological system. Especially, we see this as the natural sciences examine the largest questions of all – as to our origins and as to the boundaries and the essential properties of the universe: at these limit-points scientists inevitably wax philosophical. As O’Donovan points out ‘We expect scientific knowledge to ‘comprehend’ or ‘contain’ its object, whereas in this knowledge the object contains us.’ (p. 79) This reminds us that, though we may have knowledge of the totality, it is never total or complete knowledge.

c. FROM A HUMAN POSITION
It is also the fact that whatever knowledge we have is knowledge from a human position. This is a refinement of the notion of the ‘from within-ness’ of our knowledge. Humans know as other creatures do not. We name the creatures; they do not name us – they do not know us as we know them. To human creatures is given the task of recognizing the true nature of the things around them. In their calling to dominion over the creatures of the earth, sky and sea, men and women are equipped with the capacity to know and the authority that comes from such knowledge. The business of knowing things is task in which humankind is expected to be faithful and to use in the service of the creator.
We do indeed need to recall that in this as in other God-given tasks man and woman have been miserably deficient to the detriment of the creation itself. As in other things, knowledge is checked by the fallen-ness of would-be knowers. Human beings are not now some other creature because of the fall. But they are not the beings that they were supposed to be. We know truly, but also falsely, in error and in lapse of judgement. We are by turns enlightened and confused. The cancer of ignorance weakens the bones of our knowledge. We construct false totalities and invest ordinary material objects with divine properties.

d. NOT OF THE END OF ALL THINGS
So then, we must reckon with what we do not know. What we successfully apprehend of the created order does not include its end. We do not see far beyond the horizon – the destination of all things lies hidden in the sovereign power of God. There is no philosophy of history aside from that which is revealed to us in the Scriptures.

Saturday, February 12, 2011

Nine aberrant forms of Christian leadership

In preparation for my talks at the SUEU Leadership conference I have been thinking about when Christian leadership goes wrong. That's pretty much all the time, given human limitations and sinfulness, I guess. But I guess we can't help thinking it could all be so much better. In this list I haven't included the nakedly corrupt, abusive and immoral - in one sense, they don't need describing. However those forms of leadership will flourish where Christians forget that Christian leaders are certainly to be held accountable and are as frail and temptable as anyone else. I should say upfront that I certainly recognise aspects of some of these in my own ministry.

1. The Narcissist The easiest way to spot a narcissist is when they are confronted by criticism. The narcissist usually goes a long to shield themselves from any criticism, and will usually employ or work with those who don't dare to contradict them. But when criticism does come through, the narcissist deflects it by saying that the person who gives it is either bad, or mad. The criticism itself may be described as persecution, and evidence that the true gospel is being preached.
Theological solution The narcissist has an insufficient doctrine of sin in the life of the believer and, in practical terms at least, is too positive about the progress of their own sanctification. A mature leader develops a healthy attitude to criticism which enables one to discern which criticism is valid and which is unwarranted.

2. The Control Freak The control freak will always want to live in a world in which they are able to be omniscient and omnipotent - hence, control freaks find it hard to grow churches beyond a certain size. They can't trust anyone. They tend to be inflexible about rules, and closed to ideas that they didn't think of. They find it hard to descriminate between issues that really matter, and issues that don't. They want to know what their congregation is doing.
Theological solution The control freak needs to really know and practice in real life the Sovereignty of God. Strangely, leaders who are controlling will very often preach this doctrine as a means to bolster their own sovereignty... which shows that they haven't understood it at all. It's a stressful existence.

3. The Wimp The weak and indecisive leader is often imprisoned by the awareness of their own weakness and so becomes the opposite: authoritarian. An authoritarian leader is very often a weak leader trying to overcompensate. He or she is so befuddled by advice that he/she just has to ignore it, or chose one advisor and make them infallible. Sometimes they theologise their weakness as Christlikeness...., or make it seem spiritual.
Theological solution The weak leader can take great heart from the number of biblical weak and fearful leaders there are and that God has used! Moses, or Gideon, for example. But the weak leader needs a doctrine of the Holy Spirit - to know and realise that they are empowered and authorised by the power and authority of God himself. And they need to develop a courage based on the resurrection of Jesus from the dead in the power of the Spirit, a Spirit which gives us grounds for confidence.

4. The 'I don't do windows' leader This leader has isolated their leadership role to one particular gift and doesn't stray much from it. Usually this means the preparation and delivery of sermons. On the one hand, this can come from a belief in the giftedness of the body of Christ in all its diversity. But this belief is take out of all proportion: the church and the world have needs that need serving. They have bought the contemporary notion of giftedness as a kind of internal and ontological property belonging to each believer - and not the equipping of God's people by the Holy Spirit to do what needs doing for the sake of his people.
Theological solution See above - a proper understanding of the nature of those gifts for the edification of the church is needed.

5. The Macho This leader has a reading of complementarianism that anchors it in a particular reading of maleness and femaleness, and is unaware how culturally bound it is. Leadership is male; therefore, maleness must be emphasised. You hear them using lots of military metaphors and talking about extreme sports as an analogy for the Christian life. Jesus is spoken of as the epitome of this kind of masculinity.
Theological solution A proper Christology - which means a proper reading of the gospels - will see that the picture of Jesus' masculinity is far less like a kind of 1st century Rambo than the Macho thinks.... he got beat up and killed, after all!

6. The Member of the Guild The aim of this Christian leader is to match it with his or her peers from college (or wherever). Their frustration (or smug satisfaction) with their church is because if it won't perform as expected, then they will look dumb at their next reunion. They minister and pastor, but as a means to an end. Their ministry is all technique and no heart. They ensure that they are seen as a 'player' in denominational politics.
Theological solution Whose church is it after all?

7. The Self-legislator The self-legislator is a child of the revolution. Rules and institutions get in the way of the gospel, as far as they see it. They are happy to take the denominational badge, but show contempt for denominational distinctives and denominational officials. 'It is easier to ask forgiveness than permission' is their mantra.
Theological solution Again, the doctrine of sin in the Christian life reminds us that making oneself accountable to others is imperative. There is an overconfidence in one's own ability to determine Scriptural truth without reference to others - thus a misunderstanding of the clarity of Scripture as it was developed in the Reformation. There is also a failure to see the work of the Holy Spirit as active in the life of the church over the course of history.

8. The Change-averter The change-averter is deeply conservative and will put the brakes on any change whatsoever as a point of principle. They can't quite explain why change is bad or why the status quo is better, but they are able to kybosh almost any new thought by throwing dust in the air. For them, seniority alone is the best qualification for leadership in the church.
Theological solution Once again, a proper view of sin ought to help us have a critical reception of traditions. Some are good and worthy; others are the result of human imperfections and limitations. Discernment is needed in these matters.

9. The Pragmatist Whatever works is the bottom line here. The pragmatist hasn't bought a theological book since leaving college and his or her shelves are covered with secular leadership books. Or, if they are a lay person you will most likely hear them complaining about the lack of application in the sermons.
Theological solution Pragmatism is not bad, but the church is not a company and the ministers are not the CEO. The gospel is not a programme or advertising slogan.

Thursday, February 10, 2011

Holding back on lay administration

Sydney Anglicans have with great patience and restraint argued their case for lay administration over many years. They have marvelled at the way in which this has been equated with the open endorsement of a form of immorality against which Scripture directly speaks in other Anglican churches. They have been astonished at the passionate response to this attempt to change church order, when significant challenges to orthodox doctrine and ethics - and indeed, church order - go unremarked. They have been surprised at the innovations contemplated in the name of equality and mission, but resisted on this particular matter. If lay administration is a second order issue, as even Nicholas Taylor will admit, then why has it elicited so much hostility?

Despite all of this, I would like to argue that Sydney ought not go ahead with lay administration in the foreseeable future. I don’t think that there are any theological objections insofar as I would (and have) happily receive the Lord’s Supper in a Baptist church from a lay person and consider that the sacrament was in no way deficient – in fact, I would find it offensive were any Anglican to suggest it was in some way incomplete celebration. However, I do think it is not wise or necessary to proceed with this innovation at this time. I have six reasons.

First, despite what some of its proponents claim, it is not in fact a ‘gospel issue’. Calling it a gospel issue posits an either-or that is simply not accurate. It confuses gospel issues with church order issues. The reason for calling it a gospel issue is that reserving the act of administration at the Supper for the ordained priest/presbyter allegedly communicates a view of the sacrament which sets it apart from the Word and makes it a special means of grace in addition to the gospel in some way – along the lines of a Roman Catholic theology of the sacraments. However, there is no sense in which a Communion service run in the evangelical parishes of the diocese of Sydney could ever be confused in that way. The usual practice communicates anything but a sacerdotal view of the Supper - and there is no evidence that anyone thinks that it does. The ministers do not normally robe or even wear collars these days. The locally authorised liturgies specifically rule out a sacerdotal interpretation of the Communion. Who administers at the Supper becomes then a matter of church order rather than of the gospel itself.

Second, Sydney diocese has an enormous opportunity for a leadership of service within the Anglican Communion in the first decades of the twenty-first century – in countries where it is often difficult to be a Christian such as Egypt, Madagascar and Myanmar. Anglicans in these countries may class themselves as ‘evangelicals’ but may often just understand themselves to be ‘Anglican’ without reference to a party. They are conservative in theological outlook and looking for help in mission. They are reluctant to accept it from the liberal wing of the church, especially from the Episcopal Church of the USA which they feel has become morally compromised since consecrating two actively homosexual bishops. They are concerned that the same spirit of private judgement and self-legislation without wider consultation is at play in Sydney. Perhaps in Sydney we may quibble with their judgement on this matter. And yet cooperation with these churches is an opportunity for proclaiming Jesus. Can we not bear with the brethren on this matter for the sake of the good it might bring? Is it really of such importance in our own context that we cannot hold back? Is it really affecting our mission here in Sydney?

Third, evangelicals in other parts of the Anglican Communion aren’t calling for it with any enthusiasm. At present, many evangelicals look to Sydney for support and to see what might be achieved by evangelicals within an Anglican framework. That relationship would certainly be compromised by pushing ahead with lay administration. Sydney-trained clergy in other parts of the world would be given fewer opportunities and viewed with greater suspicion as a result of this change. In fact, Sydney-trained clergy serving outside Sydney have often called on Sydney to exercise restraint in this matter.

Fourth, simply as a matter of tactics lay administration is ill-advised. Currently, the North American liberals are tearing the Anglican Communion apart with their innovations. They have acted precipitously and selfishly. They have severely compromised the integrity of the Anglican Communion. The Sydney diocese does not share, as a matter ecclesiological conviction, the view of the unity of the Communion that others do. However, moving forward with lay presidency offers a chance for people to compare the two kinds of innovation and to view them as equivalent. A Communion wanting to appear even-handed may expel Sydney just as it expels ECUSA. Far better to allow the crisis over homosexual bishops to play itself out in the Communion and see what new state of play eventuates then to give those whose hatred of Sydney is implacable a cause to move against it.

Fifth, it is simply the case that no practical necessity drives lay administration in Sydney. There are plenty of candidates for ministry, and plenty of serving presbyters – certainly compared to other dioceses. The current practice is for a monthly communion or perhaps less. Almost every practical concern could be overcome. The current policy of only ordaining as presbyters those who are rectors is perhaps an obstacle, in that congregational leaders may frequently not be presbyters. I would be in favour of returning to the old system. Nevertheless, diaconal administration - which is currently in place – has made this need less urgent.

Sixthly, even though in my judgement no real case of any substance has been put against lay administration, the arguments have singularly failed to convince the wider Anglican Communion even slightly, let alone others in the Australian church. Many of those not convinced would count themselves as dear friends of the Sydney diocese. Whatever one’s opinion of the matter, this is precisely the opposite of the case with women’s ordination, where a clear majority of the Australian church were in favour. It may seem that almost four decades is a long time to be considering a change such as this. But more work is needed from the Sydney point of view to convince others of the pressing need – if pressing it is – for this change. It is telling that no significant monograph from a Sydney theologian has appeared in support of lay administration. Could Sydney really push ahead with the change without majority approval at a national level?
This may seem like a surprising conclusion. However it is arguably more consistent with the Christian gospel, which enjoins us not to insist on our own rights but to consider the needs of others. For a chance of sharing with the Anglicans of Myanmar or Egypt or Chile in their call to preach the gospel, I would readily lay down my insistence on a particular change of church order on which nothing of consequence hangs (if we are to be honest about it). Though no substantial arguments have appeared to counter lay administration at a theological level, here is an opportunity to show patient endurance for the sake of others. Are we mature enough as an institution to take that opportunity?

Tuesday, February 08, 2011

Ross Gittins on leadership in contemporary Oz

.....It's a dramatic demonstration of the way Australians are losing the ability to fall in behind a leader.
All of us know the nation's problems won't be overcome without decisive leadership. We regularly bewail our politicians' lack of courage and conviction, their reluctance to risk their personal survival in the country's best interests.
Yet we give our leaders so little loyalty. The announcement of a government decision is taken as the occasion for the outbreak of dissent. All those with a reason for objecting cry out and their criticism is amplified by the media, whereas those who agree fall silent. No one feels obliged to actively support the leader, even if just because she is our leader and someone has to accept ultimate responsibility for deciding what we'll do and how we'll do it.
Of course, no one wants to live in a country where the leader's will is never challenged. We each have the democratic right to oppose all government decisions by all legal means. But we also have the democratic right to support, defend or even just acquiesce in the judgment of the people we elected to lead us.
Ross Gittins

Tuesday, February 01, 2011

The Eternal Difficulty of Leadership

The Australian federal election campaign of 2010 was the perfect illustration of the contemporary problem of leadership. And it’s this: we want a leader we can trust, but we aren’t ready to trust anyone. Or to put it another way: we want a leader who is real, but we aren’t prepared to believe anything they say.

The most telling moment was when Julia Gillard, who had followed perfectly the formula for contemporary electioneering by repeating her ‘moving forward’ phrase over and over again like we were idiots, announced that she was throwing away the script and that we were now going to get the ‘real Julia Gillard’ – which chiefly meant speaking without notes and answering questions. Only, anyone could see that this was itself a strategy, a tactic driven by polls and market research, which was saying that we voters want authenticity in our leaders, and even if we are idiots don’t like to be told that we are. We could have no confidence that this was anymore the real Julia than the moving forward Julia. Even if it was the ‘real’ Julia, we had no way of believing that it was – there was the crafted and practiced ‘spontaneity’, but not the unguarded moment that tells us the truth about her real character.

This is not only a problem for Gillard. Modern politics is – and thus modern politicians are - all persona and no person. I think this is why we are fascinated by the private lives of those who lead us – because we want to see if their public pose is authentic, or whether it is just a trick in order to get us to follow them. If we could discover, by combing through their garbage, some piece of authentically human detritus – a leg razor with real hairs in it, a half-eaten burrito, a discarded condom wrapper, some left over antibiotics – we might begin to believe in them as real. What makes it really complex is that having discovered they are real, we might not want them to lead us anymore.

Such are the peculiarities of leadership in the 21st century. Like so many things in contemporary life, our attitude to leaders is paradoxical: on the one hand we are incredibly gullible when it comes to some forms of leadership and some leaders. On the other, we are deeply cynical towards those who lead us. We want to be lead, desperately; but the possibility of a human being fulfilling our expectations is unlikely.

We see this in the cult of celebrity. Fame conveys on people a kind of tacit authority. Bizarrely, expertise or success in one area we feel leads to expertise in another. It conveys a kind of transferrable authority – my ability to play cricket or to sing translates into an ability to choose which brand of cola to drink. That’s why advertisers love celebrity endorsements. It comes because good leadership is so attractive to human beings: we deep down want to believe that there are leaders out there who make a difference and who are worth trusting and are perhaps a cut above the ordinary. We really want there to be leaders who are able and who care for us and are not just drunk on fame or power. That is the attraction of the The West Wing: the fantasy that anyone as intelligent and good as Jed Bartlett could ever get elected.

We like the feeling a good leader gives us, because good leadership can take us further than we thought it was possible to go. As the American author David Foster Wallace said in 2000:

A real leader can somehow get us to do certain things that deep down we think are good and want to be able to do but usually can't get ourselves to do on our own ... A leader's true authority is the power you voluntarily give him, and you grant him this authority not in a resigned or resentful way but happily; it feels right. Deep down, you almost always like how a real leader makes you feel, how you find yourself working harder and pushing yourself and thinking in ways you wouldn't be able to if there weren't this person you respected and believed in and wanted to please.

Being led feels great. You can see the potential danger here: good leadership is so powerful it is almost intoxicating. But we so rarely find this. We want Bartlett, but if there ever was a Bartlett, we wouldn’t believe in him. We always fear that we have a Richard Nixon (the US President who resigned in disgrace over the Watergate scandal in 1974). We are suspicious and cynical about leaders and their spin, especially in the political world. We have been so often bitterly disappointed in leaders and in leadership. The sincerity of politicians is so carefully calculated and practiced that we just don’t believe it any more. Leaders have become such successful actors and manipulators that we just don’t know when we are getting real and when we are getting fake. That’s the Julia Gillard problem. And to be fair, it is hard to know how she (or anyone else) could ever overcome it.

It is a human problem, actually. Human leaders are only human. They are finite. They do not know everything. They cannot do everything. And they are, everyone of them, failures. They fail - sometimes terribly. Even their mundane failures are still failures. However, leadership - built as it is on power and authority – is a concept of such transcendence that it is almost divine. It is not accident that since ancient times leadership has been associated with the sacred – and that some leaders have even pretended to divinity itself. No human being is really worthy of the tasks and responsibilities of leadership.

Is there something lost in the prevention and/or relief of suffering?

[being the second part of the piece begun in the previous post]

Evangelical Christians are certainly of the view that human suffering ought to be prevented and relieved wherever possible, and where the means of doing so are ethical. It is not accidental that evangelical Christians, along with Christians of other traditions, have frequently been advocates for the development of medicine and the care of the sick and suffering. As Professor Rodney Stark showed in his book The Rise of Christianity, the early Christians were notable for their determination to alleviate the suffering of the sick. The belief in an orderly universe governed by a good God has long been recognised as the stimulus to medicine, over against the view that the world is beholden to competing pagan deities or to capricious chance.

The gospels record many instances of Jesus’ work as a healer of disease and disability – and his compassion for the suffering of those so afflicted. The apostles likewise are depicted as restoring physical wholeness to several individuals. Christians are called upon to pray for the sick (James 5:14-15). Following these examples, it would be remarkable for a Christian to see the relief and prevention of suffering as undesirable.

The Bible warns human beings against all forms of utopianism. Though human ingenuity will lead to the amelioration of the human condition in many respects, suffering will emerge in new forms. Though it is the Christian view that suffering of one kind or another is inevitable, this does not mean that Christians are resigned to suffering such that they will do nothing to alleviate it.

It is possible, however, that Christians will feel the need to object to certain calculations about the alleviation of suffering if they are based on the assumption that suffering is unredeemable. The elimination of suffering is not always the highest good. Suffering may not always destroy human dignity; it may indeed enhance it – for example, when one is able to suffer in the place of or for the good of others. Believing in the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, Christians hold that suffering is not ultimate in human life.