Friday, May 04, 2007

The Trouble With Principle - Stanley Fish (review)


It must be hard to be liberal in a world full of extremists, hard-liners and fanatics. Liberalism – the ideological offspring of the eighteenth century Enlightenment – is the convictional pattern that today governs practically all public and intellectual discourse in the Western world. Liberals appeal to a set of principles that they hold to be incontrovertible, even “self-evident”: free speech, equality, tolerance, freedom of belief, democracy, the right of the individual to make independent and autonomous moral decisions. These are the dogmas of liberalism.

Yet every now and again the smugness and complacency of liberal thinking is exposed for the sham it is - usually when people whose rights liberals advocate won’t behave. For example, when indigenous or third world peoples speak against homosexuality, western liberals are quite plainly confused as to how to respond without appearing racist, as was the case with the Episcopalian bishops at the Anglican Lambeth conference in 1998. Likewise when David Irving, the historian who claims that the Holocaust was largely a hoax, sought permission into Australia, his right to freedom of speech was denied it because it was thought he might inflame racial hatred. Further, when novelist Salman Rushdie was condemned to death by the Ayotollah Khomeini, this was deemed by Western observers as taking free speech too far. The principles of free speech and the tolerance and protection of minorities are plainly at cross purposes.
The trouble is, liberals appear to advocate a comprehensive tolerance when in fact they do nothing of the kind. They would advocate freedom of religious belief – so long as that freedom does not transgress its carefully proscribed limits. Religious belief, for example, should not be a matter for parliaments or courts, nor should it have any influence there. And yet for any person holding such a religious belief, this caveat will seem hilarious. How can any truly and firmly held belief be discarded as if of no relevance in one sphere of life?

This, in Stanley Fish’s words, is “boutique multiculturalism”. A boutique multiculturalist will “always stop short of approving other cultures at a point where some value at their center generates an act that offends against the canons of civilised decency as they have either been declared or assumed.” (p.56) A boutique multiculturalist suffers from an inability to take seriously the core values of the cultures he or she tolerates. He or she apparently enjoys diversity, but only when divergent cultures and views are presented in sanitised or tame versions.

A “strong multiculturalist”, on the other hand, makes a genuine effort: tolerance is stipulated as the first principle, and tries to accord all cultures a deep respect at their core. However, as Fish points out, strong multiculturalism founders when it encounters the very intolerance it loathes at the centre of another belief system. How do you respond to Muslim intolerance of Rushdie? You might tolerate it, in which case tolerance is no longer your core principle; or you might condemn it, in which case you turn out to be another boutique multiculturalist after all.

Stanley Fish’s aim in his book The Trouble with Principle is to unpick the rhetoric of liberalism and expose it as dishonest at the core. As he explains it, the really dangerous thing about the liberal appeal to principles is that it uses the rhetoric of neutrality and distance while being nothing of the kind. It takes the moral high ground, aloof from irrational evils like “dogmatism” and “fanaticism”, all the while being just as dogmatic, fanatical and irrational. It is “a wolf in reason’s clothing”. (p.187)

The strategy of liberalism is to clear a public space, free (allegedly) from ideological (and especially religious) concerns, and in which only agreed truths, such as “two plus two equals four”, may prosper. Other beliefs may be held, but only in private. The curriculum for a secular education, for example, should be absolutely free from religious influence. However, Fish points out that what is and what is not ideological is itself a matter of dispute: “Christ is risen” may be such a truth for some and not for others. In addition, in late twentieth century Western democracies, the values and ideology of liberalism are held to “go without saying”. The values and ideology of Christianity may only be held in a private way. They must be set aside in the public sphere.

The double standard of this seems obvious to me now that Fish has pointed it out! Whenever Christians enter into the public sphere as Christians they are exposed to ridicule and held to have transgressed the sacred boundaries traced by liberalism. David Marr’s book The High Price of Heaven is an example of just such a sustained and bitter attack on Christian interference in public affairs from an openly liberal perspective. He wears his boutique multiculturalism on his sleeve: he is completely – unashamedly - intolerant of Christian social policy in all its forms.

Stanley Fish is a delightful scallywag; but he is far more than that. Over four decades he has established himself as a world-class Miltonist, a philosopher of law, and a literary theorist. His books are always provocative and argued with an intense and vigorous logic. His texts are full of closely worked examples and case studies, where the implications are meticulously teased out. He does not like a snow-job: and he is happiest untangling and exposing them. Perhaps liberalism is the biggest snow-job of all.

Fish’s extensive study of the Christian poet John Milton has given him an understanding of what it is to believe. Indeed, he rightly sees that none of us is without “beliefs” – shaped by history and context and other beliefs - that stand prior to rationality. In fact, our beliefs actually condition our use of reason, more than we are conscious of. There is something deeply internal to true beliefs. They claim our souls and change our lives. Liberals, despite their rhetoric, want to hold all other belief systems at arms length – to admire, but not to really understand from within. They draw a wedge between “belief” and “reason”, and with extreme prejudice. Of course, this is all done by appeal to apparently neutral “principles”. The sleight of hand is obvious in the slow motion replays Fish allows us with his careful analysis: these “principles” are not neutral at all, but suit the vested interests of those who hold them.

The lessons to learn from Stanley Fish are many. We Christians have perhaps grown ashamed of our commitments and beliefs in the public sphere. We have perhaps bought the liberal rhetoric of neutrality too readily. We have perhaps hoped that we could easily shed our most deeply held beliefs when we needed to speak in public. We have perhaps allowed ourselves to be marginalised as “fundamentalists” and “fanatics”. We are perhaps embarrassed to cause a fuss and call the bluff of the liberals who sanctimoniously call on people with beliefs other than their own to hide them in public. What the rigorous analysis of Fish reveals is that the impressive edifice of liberalism is in fact a mirage; and that we need pay it far less deference than we do.

Like the Wizard of Oz, the very real power of liberalism rests on the illusion of substance.

13 comments:

Tim Adeney said...

Great Review.

I think I should go and buy the book.

Tim

Jonathan said...

A mirage indeed. Not many people understand when I suggest that the question is not are you fundamentalist or liberal, but to which fundamentals you hold.

Bruce Yabsley said...

Fish has an always-interesting blog at the NYT website, called Think Again. (Sorry, in the subscription-only section.) There have been a number of posts recently on church-and-state-and-academia issues --- hard to get more vexed than that in the US, abortion excepted --- and they are pleasingly critical and thought-through. One fairly serious quibble: he seems to equate the idea that (within a religion) something is true-and-important, with that thing being a matter of salvation. Clearly they can be related, and one might argue that in some cases the relationship is close, but they scarcely seem to me to be the same thing.

Michael your polemic here is very entertaining, and I must confess that I haven't read the Fish book that you're speaking to, but: this sounds more like your voice than his, if his blog is anything to go by. From what I've read he sounds much more like a maverick or a heretic within the liberal cause, with all that that implies.

Jonathan wrote: the question is not are you fundamentalist or liberal, but to which fundamentals you hold.

Come now. What if one has sympathies with more than one side, dislikes the idea of "sides" generally, and is nonplussed by calls to sign up to a particular party?

michael jensen said...

Yes, Bruce, the description of Fish as maverick is probably accurate: I think he would be in favour of a fairly liberal order of things. It is just that he is a pragmatist, and likes to challenge idealism.

metalepsis said...

thanks for the review!

Jonathan said...

I'm not sure where sides or parties come into the question. Holding to certain fundamentals does not imply taking sides on every issue. In fact, dislike of taking sides could be one of the fundamental principles I am talking about.

It is true that some people may consider more issues to be fundamental than others, and so perhaps labels such as fundamentalist and liberal can be useful, but it really does hide the fact that the real question is what our fundamental principles are.

Joanna said...

An excellent review Michael. I wish I'd known about this book last year when defending my right to religious belief in "Intercultural Interventions". I'm sure my version of the same argument was not as skillful :-s

Still, I managed to work in the phrase, "it would be better to ask me to decapitate myself when engaging with the political sphere as to ask me to leave my religious beliefs out of it." What a mouthful! :-)

Bruce Yabsley said...

and so perhaps labels such as fundamentalist and liberal can be useful, but it really does hide the fact that the real question is what our fundamental principles are

Well, this is a question; and it's a useful question if the aim is to think critically about one's commitments and one's projects, and ask if they are coherent. Personally I think it's an important question.

But the real question? I don't believe it's possible to think or to live consistently from first principles; and I think it's possible to act, or to find agreement about actions, while disagreeing or being confused about principles. I am, in other words, a believer in the necessity and the value of judgement.

I am happy to subscribe to every item in the list at the beginning of Michael's original post, as matters of practice and also as values (or goods): free speech, equality, tolerance, freedom of belief, democracy, the right of the individual to make independent and autonomous moral decisions. I don't think these are the only values or goods, and I'm quite sceptical about some of the proposed bases for such things; for both reasons I'm opposed to some of the wilder attempts at applying such "principles".

I find that I can usefully label myself "a conservative with liberal sympathies", both in religion and in ethics. I cannot give nearly so neat an account of what my "fundamental principles" are. And if I were approached and asked "to which fundamentals do you hold?", then I'm afraid yes, I would strongly suspect I was being invited to take sides in a dispute between parties, for such a question leaves judgement out of account.

Drew said...

I bought this book a few years ago after reading your review of it in Kategoria - I enjoyed it so much. He is such a delightful scallywag, isn't he?

I gave it to a friend, who used it in writing a research paper on the judgement in the Victorian 'Catch the fire' religious vilification case (for international readers: a contentious court case in Australia over vilification of Muslims) as a perfect example of the sham-nature of liberalism.

Jonathan said...

I'm posting this for the third time, hopefully without leaving too much out.

Even if Bruce is not implying that judgement is one of his "fundamental principles", speaking of the "necessity and value of judgement" can be a bit of a cop out. All principles are applied through judgement, and any judgement is based on underlying values or principles.

Having said that, I agree that a person's principles need not be neatly expressible. I cannot even label myself as neatly as Bruce. I certainly do not intend to use "to which fundamentals do you hold" as a question to put someone in a box. Perhaps my point is better made if I call it not "the real question", but "the real issue" to think about and discuss, particularly when there already involved in a dispute.

Bruce Yabsley said...

This is becoming connected to the discussion in another thread (workplace ethics).

You wrote that speaking of the "necessity and value of judgement" can be a bit of a cop out. I concede this. But unless you think that I am using it as a cop-out right now, then this is not to the purpose. If I am arguing in good faith then the point remains to be considered. My point is that one cannot do without judgement.

Your counter that any judgement is based on underlying values or principles is most controversial. It may be the case, but if so then not all of these principles have been identified. And it may not, in fact, be the case. What grounds do we have for supposing that human decision-making should be like this? We know and discern things most imperfectly, being both limited and sinful. But even so, we know more than we can say or systematise.

This discussion began with Michael's post, using Fish as a springboard, stating that doctrinaire liberalism is a crock. I agree that doctrinaire liberalism is a crock, and yet I sympathise with the liberal agenda. Stanley Fish agrees that doctrinaire liberalism is a crock, and Stanley Fish is a liberal. I twitted Michael on this point and for this reason: while beating up on doctrinaire liberals is entertaining (and I do really find it entertaining), I don't see that it serves much purpose. Because if you have another agenda to advance, then polishing off the doctrinaire liberals is the easy part. Behind them, you have to deal with a large army of fellow-travellers, including Stanley Fish, and (although I should not mention myself in the same breath) including me. Showing that the emperor is naked will not work, because we already know that. And challenging us on principle will not work either, because whatever mix of principle and muddling-through we have settled on has already landed us where we are: supping, however reluctantly, with the liberals, and not believing them to be devils ...

Jonathan said...

Bruce, I am sure that you are arguing in good faith, but I feel your arguments are completely orthogonal to most of my points (probably due to lack of clarity in my comments). Therefore speaking of judgement is an unintentional cop out in some sense, but that would be a very poor defense for saying it is a cop out. Rather, the fact that speaking of judgement is often a cop out was part of my original point. Whether or not judgement is always based on some sort of values (not necessarily identified, probably not even consistent, although I don't think it can be wrong to point out inconsistencies for consideration), the label "fundamentalist" is too often used to question someone's ability to make judgements, when really the disagreement is at the level of the principles behind the judgement.

I am not trying to say anything to those who already know the emporer is naked, as I have come across a lot of people who don't. I myself have too many "liberal sympathies" to even consider labelling myself with the label you use. My part in the discussion started with Michael's suggestion that Christians may have bought too much of the rhetoric and accepted misleading labels, rather than tackling issues at their heart.

Bruce Yabsley said...

Jonathan thank you for the clarification.

I am content to tie off the discussion at this point since our disagreement seems both to be structural, and to have been confused by my references back to Michael's original post.